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Remedies for Price Overcharges: The Deadweight Loss of Coupons and Discounts

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Author Info
A. Mitchell Polinsky (School of Law, Stanford University)
Daniel L. Rubinfeld (School of Law, University of California, Berkeley)

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Abstract

This article evaluates two different remedies for consumers who have been injured by a price overcharge on the sale of a good. Under a coupon remedy, injured consumers are awarded coupons that can be used for a limited period of time to purchase the good at a price below that which prevails after the overcharge has been eliminated, that is, below the competitive price. Under a discount remedy, any consumer, without proof of injury, may purchase the good for a limited period of time at a price that is set below the competitive price. Both remedies generally cause consumers to buy an excessive amount of the good during the remedy period. Under the coupon remedy only a subset of consumers are affected in this way (those holding a relatively high number of coupons), while under the discount remedy all consumers are affected. We show nonetheless that the resulting deadweight loss could be lower under the discount remedy. We also consider how the deadweight loss changes when the length of the remedy period is increased.

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Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Microeconomics with number 0401001.

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Length: 31 pages
Date of creation: 08 Jan 2004
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Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpmi:0401001

Note: 31 pages, Adobe.pdf
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Web page: http://129.3.20.41

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D18 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Protection
D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Monopoly
K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices

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  1. Borenstein, Severin, 1996. "Settling for Coupons: Discount Contracts as Compensation and Punishment in Antitrust Lawsuits," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 39(2), pages 379-404, October.
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  1. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, 2005. "A Damage-Revelation Rationale for Coupon Remedies," NBER Working Papers 11227, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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