The decentralization of punishments in experiments with public goods
AbstractThis paper deals with the effects of introducing adequate punishment opportunities in experiments with public goods. Decentralized punishment means that the contributing subjects have a possibility to sanction free riders without the intervention of an external authority. The very first experiments demonstrated a significantly positive effect of a punishment opportunity on enhancing cooperation in situations of social dilemma. Following studies, however, pointed at limited effectiveness of this mechanism. The first part of the paper summarizes selected literature on the topic and presents its principal findings. The second part is dedicated to the presentation of the results of an experimental series on decentralized punishment realized in the Czech Republic. The last part introduces possible questions and topics which may be subject of future research within this area.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Masaryk University, Faculty of Economics and Administration, Department of Public Economics in its series Working Papers with number 05.
Length: 33 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2012
Date of revision: Mar 2013
economic experiment; cooperation; public goods; decentralized punishment; partner and stranger matching;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-05-22 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2013-05-22 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EVO-2013-05-22 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2013-05-22 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-PUB-2013-05-22 (Public Finance)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Oliver Bochet & Talbot Page & Louis Putterman, 2002.
"Communication and Punishment in Voluntary Contribution Experiments,"
2002-29, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Bochet, Olivier & Page, Talbot & Putterman, Louis, 2006. "Communication and punishment in voluntary contribution experiments," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 11-26, May.
- Olivier Bochet & Talbot Page & Louis Putterman, 2005. "Communication and Punishment in Voluntary Contribution Experiments," Working Papers 2005-09, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- David Masclet & Laurent Denant-Boèmont & Charles Noussair, 2006.
"Punishment, Counterpunishment and Sanction Enforcement in a Social Dilemma Experiment,"
- Laurent Denant-Boemont & David Masclet & Charles Noussair, 2007. "Punishment, counterpunishment and sanction enforcement in a social dilemma experiment," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 145-167, October.
- Denant-Boemont, L. & Masclet, D. & Noussair, C.N., 2007. "Punishment, counterpunishment, and sanction enforcement in a social dilemma experiment," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-284310, Tilburg University.
- Simon Gachter & Ernst Fehr, 2000.
"Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 980-994, September.
- Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, . "Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments," IEW - Working Papers 010, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, 1999. "Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments," CESifo Working Paper Series 183, CESifo Group Munich.
- Nikos Nikiforakis & Hans-Theo Normann, 2008.
"A comparative statics analysis of punishment in public-good experiments,"
Springer, vol. 11(4), pages 358-369, December.
- Nikos Nikiforakis & Hans-Theo Normann, 2005. "A Comparative Statics Analysis of Punishment in Public-Good Experiments," Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics 05/07, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London, revised Jun 2005.
- Nikiforakis, Nikos, 2008. "Punishment and counter-punishment in public good games: Can we really govern ourselves," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(1-2), pages 91-112, February.
- Loukas Balafoutas & Nikos Nikiforakis, 2012.
"Norm enforcement in the city: A natural field experiment,"
2012-12, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck.
- Balafoutas, Loukas & Nikiforakis, Nikos, 2012. "Norm enforcement in the city: A natural field experiment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 56(8), pages 1773-1785.
- Loukas Balafoutas & Nikos Nikiforakis, 2011. "Norm Enforcement in the city: A natural field experiment," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 1133, The University of Melbourne.
- Loukas Balafoutas & Nikos Nikiforakis, 2012. "1 Norm enforcement in the city: A natural field experiment," Natural Field Experiments 00385, The Field Experiments Website.
- Andreoni, James, 1988. "Why free ride? : Strategies and learning in public goods experiments," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 291-304, December.
- Urs Fischbacher, 2007. "z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 171-178, June.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.