Why do North African firms involve in corruption ?
AbstractThis paper empirically analyzes the main microeconomic determinants of different forms of corruption supply. Our study is based on a new database of near 600 Algerian, Moroccan and Tunisian firms. We show that the undeclared part of firms' sales is a major factor of their involvement in administrative corruption. The latter increases with the part of the firm's informal activity as far as it is inferior to 55% of total sales, before slightly decreasing. State capture is rather strengthened by a failing enforcement of property and contract rights. Moreover, both forms of corruption help to compensate a loss of competitiveness, which contradicts previous results on this issue. Finally, we draw a comparison of the factors of corruption in North Africa, Uganda and transition countries and derive policy recommendations.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne in its series Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne with number v07002.
Length: 36 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2007
Date of revision:
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Supply of corruption; administrative corruption; state capture; informal activity; competitiveness; North Africa.;
Other versions of this item:
- Clara Delavallade, 2007. "Why do North African firms involve in corruption ?," UniversitÃ© Paris1 PanthÃ©on-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00143412, HAL.
- C2 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- O17 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
- H32 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Firm
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-AFR-2007-02-24 (Africa)
- NEP-ALL-2007-02-24 (All new papers)
- NEP-DEV-2007-02-24 (Development)
- NEP-PBE-2007-02-24 (Public Economics)
- NEP-REG-2007-02-24 (Regulation)
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- G. d'Agostino & J.P Dunne & L. Pieroni, 2012.
"Government spending, corruption and economic growth,"
SALDRU Working Papers
74, Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit, University of Cape Town.
- d'Agostino, Giorgio & Dunne, Paul J. & Pieroni, Luca, 2012. "Government spending, corruption and economic growth," MPRA Paper 38109, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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