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Korruption und Schattenwirtschaft

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  • Marcel Thum

Abstract

Dieser Beitrag setzt sich mit dem Verhältnis von Schattenwirtschaft und Korruptionauseinander. Es wird insbesondere die Frage untersucht, welche Rolle die Schattenwirtschaftin korrupten Ökonomien spielt. Die Schattenwirtschaft begrenzt letztendlich dieMacht korrupter Institutionen, indem sie Unternehmen eine Ausweichmöglichkeitschafft, und ermöglicht so eine Ausdehnung produktiver Tätigkeiten, die gesamtwirtschaftlichvorteilhaft ist. Der Beitrag untersucht auch, wie sich institutionelle Rahmenbedingungenund Politikmaßnahmen auf Korruption und Schattenwirtschaft auswirken.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich in its series Ifo Working Paper Series with number Ifo Working Papers No.12.

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Date of creation: 2005
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Handle: RePEc:ces:ifowps:_no.12

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Keywords: Schattenwirtschaft; Korruption; Öffentliche Güter; Staatliche Leistungen.;

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References

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  1. Thierry Verdier & Daron Acemoglu, 2000. "The Choice between Market Failures and Corruption," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 194-211, March.
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Cited by:
  1. Sebastian Watzka & Friedrich Thießen, 2011. "Lässt sich das erneute Abgleiten in eine Wirtschafts- und Finanzkrise abwenden?," Ifo Schnelldienst, Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 64(21), pages 03-10, November.

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