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Corruption in America

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Author Info
Edward L. Glaeser
Raven Saks

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Abstract

We use a data set of federal corruption convictions in the U.S. to investigate the causes and consequences of corruption. More educated states, and to a less degree richer states, have less corruption. This relationship holds even when we use historical factors like education in 1928 or Congregationalism in 1890, as instruments for the level of schooling today. The level of corruption is weakly correlated with the level of income inequality and racial fractionalization, and uncorrelated with the size of government. There is a weak negative relationship between corruption and employment and income growth. These results echo the cross-country findings, and support the view that the correlation between development and good political outcomes occurs because more education improves political institutions.

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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 10821.

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Date of creation: Oct 2004
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Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:10821

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H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. John McMillan & Pablo Zoido, 2004. "How to Subvert Democracy: Montesinos in Peru," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
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  2. La Porta, Rafael & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert, 1999. "The Quality of Government," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 15(1), pages 222-79, April.
    Other versions:
  3. McMillan, John & Zoido, Pablo, 2004. "How to Subvert Democracy: Montesinos in Peru," Research Papers 1851r, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business. [Downloadable!]
  4. Mauro, Paolo, 1995. "Corruption and Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 110(3), pages 681-712, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Edward L. Glaeser & Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 2004. "Do Institutions Cause Growth?," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 9(3), pages 271-303, 09. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Edward L. Glaeser & Albert Saiz, 2003. "The Rise of the Skilled City," NBER Working Papers 10191, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Jakob Svensson, 2003. "Who Must Pay Bribes And How Much? Evidence From A Cross Section Of Firms," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 118(1), pages 207-230, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Alesina, Alberto & Baqir, Reza & Easterly, William, 2000. "Redistributive Public Employment," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 219-241, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Edward L. Glaeser & Claudia Goldin, 2004. "Corruption and Reform: An Introduction," NBER Working Papers 10775, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, 2003. "The Rise of the Regulatory State," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 41(2), pages 401-425, June.
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  11. Daniel Berkowitz & Karen Clay, . "Initial Conditions, Institutional Dynamics and Economic Performance: Evidence from the American States," American Law & Economics Association Annual Meetings 1083, American Law & Economics Association. [Downloadable!]
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  12. Goel, Rajeev K & Nelson, Michael A, 1998. " Corruption and Government Size: A Disaggregated Analysis," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 97(1-2), pages 107-20, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Rappaport, Jordan & Sachs, Jeffrey D, 2003. " The United States as a Coastal Nation," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 5-46, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1993. "Corruption," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 108(3), pages 599-617, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1993. "Corruption," NBER Working Papers 4372, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Isaac Ehrlich & Francis T. Lui, 1999. "Bureaucratic Corruption and Endogenous Economic Growth," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(S6), pages S270-29, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Fisman, Raymond & Gatti, Roberta, 2002. " Decentralization and Corruption: Evidence from U.S. Federal Transfer Programs," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 113(1-2), pages 25-35, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Rose-Ackerman, Susan, 1975. "The economics of corruption," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 187-203, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Christopher J. Ellis & Oguzhan C. Dincer & Glenn R. Waddell, 2005. "Corruption, Decentralization and Yardstick Competition," University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers 2005-5, University of Oregon Economics Department, revised 01 Jan 2006. [Downloadable!]
  2. Benjamin A. Olken, 2006. "Corruption Perceptions vs. Corruption Reality," NBER Working Papers 12428, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Oguzhan C. Dincer & Peter J. Lambert, 2006. "Taking care of your own: Ethnic and religious heterogeneity and income inequality," Working Papers 48, ECINEQ, Society for the Study of Economic Inequality. [Downloadable!]
  4. Peter T. Leeson & Russell S. Sobel, 2006. "Weathering Corruption," Working Papers 06-07, Department of Economics, West Virginia University. [Downloadable!]
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