Corruption in America
Abstract
We use a data set of federal corruption convictions in the U.S. to investigate the causes and consequences of corruption. More educated states, and to a less degree richer states, have less corruption. This relationship holds even when we use historical factors like education in 1928 or Congregationalism in 1890, as instruments for the level of schooling today. The level of corruption is weakly correlated with the level of income inequality and racial fractionalization, and uncorrelated with the size of government. There is a weak negative relationship between corruption and employment and income growth. These results echo the cross-country findings, and support the view that the correlation between development and good political outcomes occurs because more education improves political institutions.Download Info
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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 10821.Length:
Date of creation: Oct 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:10821
Note: EFG LE
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Keywords:Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2004-11-22 (All new papers)
- NEP-HIS-2004-11-22 (Business, Economic & Financial History)
- NEP-URE-2004-11-22 (Urban & Real Estate Economics)
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Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
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10-12, Department of Economics, West Virginia University.
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