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Déterminants et perspectives de la privatisation des infrastructures à Djibouti : Leçons tirées de trois études de cas

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Abstract

This paper questions the determinants of infrastructure privatization in Djibouti and seeks to explain why this policy is still implemented today. Through case studies, the paper analyses the privatization processes of the port, electricity, and railway sectors. The paper shows that privatization has four major determinants: the presence of favourable contingent elements; the presence of political interests; the extent to which the contractual arrangements conform to government expectations, and the existence of alternative solutions. Furthermore, the paper explains that privatization is still considered today because the change of its target makes the interests of the government, donors, and private investors compatible

Suggested Citation

  • Arthur Foch, 2013. "Déterminants et perspectives de la privatisation des infrastructures à Djibouti : Leçons tirées de trois études de cas," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 13036, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
    • Handle: RePEc:mse:cesdoc:13036
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Privatization; infrastructure; determinants; impacts; Djibouti;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F23 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - Multinational Firms; International Business
    • F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
    • F35 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Foreign Aid
    • H54 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Infrastructures
    • H82 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Governmental Property
    • L33 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprise and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
    • O55 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economywide Country Studies - - - Africa

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