US Politics and World Bank IDA-Lending
AbstractThis paper studies the role of US political factors in the allocation of World Bank concessional lending, where US political interests are proxied by voting similarity in the United Nations General Assembly on issues identified as important by the US Department of State. In contrast to previous studies we find that the US exerted a significant influence on IDA lending during the period 1993 - 2000. We demonstrate that the influence was both statistically as well as economically significant. Finally, we demonstrate that our result is robust with respect to the omission of the IDA Country Performance Rating index.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 05-06.
Length: 21 pages
Date of creation: Aug 2004
Date of revision: May 2005
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aid; World Bank; US political influence;
Other versions of this item:
- Thomas Barnebeck Andersen & Henrik Hansen & Thomas Markussen, 2006. "US politics and World Bank IDA-lending," Journal of Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 42(5), pages 772-794.
- F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
- F35 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Foreign Aid
- O19 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - International Linkages to Development; Role of International Organizations
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-AFR-2005-04-24 (Africa)
- NEP-ALL-2005-04-24 (All new papers)
- NEP-DEV-2005-04-24 (Development)
- NEP-POL-2005-04-24 (Positive Political Economics)
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