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Anonymous and Neutral Social Choice:Existence Results on Resoluteness

Author

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  • Onur Doğan

    (Murat Sertel Center for Advanced Economic Studies)

  • Ayça Ebru Giritligil

    (Murat Sertel Center for Advanced Economic Studies,Istanbul Bilgi University)

Abstract

We present the existence conditions of anonymous, neutral and resolute social welfare and social choice rules in a group theoretical framework. We define the maximum domain at which such aggregation rules exist. We propose a tie-breaking procedure to obtain resolute refinements of social choice rules, which preserves anonymity and neutrality. The conditions for this refinement to satisfy simple monotonicity are compared with such conditions for the resolute refinements obtained via conventional tie-breaking mechanisms.

Suggested Citation

  • Onur Doğan & Ayça Ebru Giritligil, 2015. "Anonymous and Neutral Social Choice:Existence Results on Resoluteness," Working Papers 201501, Murat Sertel Center for Advanced Economic Studies, Istanbul Bilgi University.
    • Handle: RePEc:msc:wpaper:201501
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Daniela Bubboloni & Michele Gori, 2014. "Anonymous and neutral majority rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 43(2), pages 377-401, August.
    2. M. Sanver & William Zwicker, 2012. "Monotonicity properties and their adaptation to irresolute social choice rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 39(2), pages 371-398, July.
    3. Campbell, Donald E. & Kelly, Jerry S., 2015. "The finer structure of resolute, neutral, and anonymous social choice correspondences," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 109-111.
    4. Moulin, Herve, 1988. "Condorcet's principle implies the no show paradox," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 53-64, June.
    5. K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), 2002. "Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 1, number 1.
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    Cited by:

    1. Bubboloni, Daniela & Gori, Michele, 2016. "Resolute refinements of social choice correspondences," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 37-49.
    2. Daniela Bubboloni & Michele Gori & Claudia Meo, 2024. "Symmetric mechanisms for two-sided matching problems," Papers 2404.01404, arXiv.org.
    3. Ali Ihsan Ozkes & M. Remzi Sanver, 2017. "Procedural versus Opportunity-Wise Equal Treatment of Alternatives: Neutrality Revisited," AMSE Working Papers 1736, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France.
    4. Daniela Bubboloni & Michele Gori, 2021. "Breaking ties in collective decision-making," Decisions in Economics and Finance, Springer;Associazione per la Matematica, vol. 44(1), pages 411-457, June.
    5. Onur Doğan & Ayça Giritligil, 2014. "Implementing the Borda outcome via truncated scoring rules: a computational study," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 159(1), pages 83-98, April.
    6. Ali I. Ozkes & M. Remzi Sanver, 2021. "Anonymous, neutral, and resolute social choice revisited," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 57(1), pages 97-113, July.

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