Whistleblowers on the Board? The Role of Independent Directors in Cartel Prosecutions
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- Murillo Campello & Daniel Ferrés & Gaizka Ormazabal, 2017. "Whistle-Blowers on the Board? The Role of Independent Directors in Cartel Prosecutions," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 60(2), pages 241-268.
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- Amore, Mario Daniele & Marzano, Riccardo, 2019. "Family Ownership and Antitrust Violations," CEPR Discussion Papers 14018, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Shweta Mehrotra & R. K. Mishra & V. Srikanth & Govind Prasad Tiwari & E. V. Mahesh Kumar, 2020. "State of Whistleblowing Research: A Thematic Analysis," FIIB Business Review, , vol. 9(2), pages 133-148, June.
- Ferrés, Daniel & Marcet, Francisco, 2021. "Corporate social responsibility and corporate misconduct," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 127(C).
- Xiaomeng Charlene Chen & Ka Wai Choi & Sue Wright & Hai Wu, 2023. "The effectiveness of sanctions on disclosure regulation: Australian evidence," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 63(4), pages 3841-3872, December.
- Lee, Hwaryung, 2016. "The Retention of Underperforming CEOs and the Implications on Collusion – Controlling Management and Preventing Collusion by Strengthening the Independence of the Board," KDI Focus 77, Korea Development Institute (KDI).
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More about this item
Keywords
Cartel Prosecution; Antitrust Policy; Leniency Programs; Independent Directors; Reputational Costs; Heckman Selection Test.;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
- K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
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