This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

The Impact of Central Bank Independence and Union Concentration on Macroeconomic Perfromance in the Presence of Aggregate Supply Shocks. Evidence from 10 OECD Countries (1971-85)

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Chou, Y.K.
Abstract

In this paper, we use panel data from 1971 to 1985 to test the hypothesis that differences in monetary and wage institutions can explain a significant fraction of the variations in the macroeconomic performance of 10 OECD countries following the OPEC shocks of 1973-74 and 1979-80. After controlling for central bank independence, we detect a hump-shaped relationship between union density and inflation, and a negative relationship between union concentration and inflation. These findings are robust to the use of different estimators and across various assumptions on the structure of error terms. The impact of central bank independence and union variables on unemployment is more ambiguous, and is sensitive to the inclusion of interactions between these variables. Interesting results are obtained when we split out sample, first by the degree of central bank independence, and then by union concentration.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.economics.unimelb.edu.au/SITE/research/workingpapers/wp00_01/805.pdf
File Format:
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by The University of Melbourne in its series Department of Economics - Working Papers Series with number 805.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 39 pages
Date of creation: 2001
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:mlb:wpaper:805

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Department of Economics, The University of Melbourne, 5th Floor, Economics and Commerce Building, Victoria, 3010, Australia
Phone: +61 3 8344 5289
Fax: +61 3 8344 6899
Email:
Web page: http://www.economics.unimelb.edu.au
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Colemann Leong).

Related research
Keywords: Collective bargaining; central bank independence; inflation; unemployment;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
E24 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomics: Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Employment; Unemployment; Wages; Intergenerational Income Distribution
E31 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Price Level; Inflation; Deflation
E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
J51 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Rogoff, Kenneth, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-89, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Cukierman, Alex & Lippi, Francesco, 1999. "Central bank independence, centralization of wage bargaining, inflation and unemployment:: Theory and some evidence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(7), pages 1395-1434, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Coricelli, Fabrizio & Cukierman, Alex & Dalmazzo, Alberto, 2001. "Economic Performance and Stabilization Policy in a Monetary Union with Imperfect Labour and Goods Markets," CEPR Discussion Papers 2745, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Chou, Y.K., 2000. "The Effect of Collective Bargaining and Central Bank Independence on Inflation and Unemployment: Evidence From the OECD," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 770, The University of Melbourne. [Downloadable!]
  5. Marta Campillo & Jeffrey A. Miron, 1996. "Why Does Inflation Differ Across Countries?," NBER Working Papers 5540, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Soskice, David, 1990. "Wage Determination: The Changing Role of Institutions in Advanced Industrialized Countries," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(4), pages 36-61, Winter.
  7. Bean, Charles R., 1994. "European unemployment: A retrospective," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(3-4), pages 523-534, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Newell, A. & Symons, J. S. V., 1987. "Corporatism, laissez-faire and the rise in unemployment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 567-601, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Marta Campillo & Jeffrey A. Miron, 1997. "Why Does Inflation Differ across Countries?," NBER Chapters, in: Reducing Inflation: Motivation and Strategy, pages 335-362 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!]
  10. Cukierman, Alex & Webb, Steven B & Neyapti, Bilin, 1992. "Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes," World Bank Economic Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(3), pages 353-98, September.
  11. Coricelli, Fabrizio & Cukierman, Alex & Dalmazzo, Alberto, 2000. "Monetary Institutions, Monopolistic Competition, Unionized Labour Markets And Economic Performance," CEPR Discussion Papers 2407, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  12. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Cubitt, Robin P, 1995. " Corporatism, Monetary Policy and Macroeconomic Performance: A Simple Game Theoretic Analysis," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 97(2), pages 245-59, June.
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? About five million pdf files are downloaded through RePEc every year.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-23.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.