Liberalization-privatization paths: policies and politics
AbstractWe empirically investigate the political determinants of deregulation policies in six network industries of thirty OECD countries, over 1975-2007. Contrary to previous literature, we unbundle privatization and liberalization policies and measure whether their simultaneous determination is affected by government’s ideology. Despite conventional wisdom, we find a systematic political trade-off between privatizations and liberalizations. Right-wing executives tend to privatize more and to liberalize less, relative to left-wing governments. The main lesson we derive is that ideological cleavages affect the composition of deregulation policy. Our results may shed new lights on the political-economic rationale behind deregulation choices.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods at Università degli Studi di Milano in its series Departmental Working Papers with number 2011-32.
Date of creation: 30 Nov 2011
Date of revision:
Liberalization; Privatization; Network Industries; Partisanship;
Other versions of this item:
- Filippo Belloc & Antonio Nicita, 2011. "Liberalization-Privatization Paths: Policies and Politics," Department of Economics University of Siena 609, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- L50 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - General
- P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism
- C23 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Models with Panel Data; Longitudinal Data; Spatial Time Series
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