This paper shows that, contrary to common conception, robust equilibrium selection is possible in the two-population model of evolution by Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993). Investigating the class of individualistic adjustment dynamics, we establish that, for generic 2x2 co-ordination games, the evolutionary process always selects the mutation-dominant equilibrium. The concepts of mutation dominance and risk dominance yield different equilibrium predictions, since the concept of mutation dominance additionally captures the systemic risk arising from random matching.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Dortmund, Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers in Economics with number
01_01.