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Finite Population Dynamics and Mixed Equilibria

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Author Info
Carlos Alós-Ferrer ()

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Abstract

This paper examines the stability of mixed-strategy Nash equilibria of sym- metric games, viewed as population profiles in dynamical systems with learning within a single, finite population. Alternative models of imitation and myopic best reply are considered and combined with different assumptions about the speed of adjustment. It is found that specific refinements of mixed Nash equi- libria serve to identify focal rest points of these dynamics in general games. The relationship between both concepts is studied. In the 2 x 2 case, both im- itation and myopic best reply yield strong stability results for the same type of mixed Nash equilibria.

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File URL: http://homepage.univie.ac.at/Papers.Econ/RePEc/vie/viennp/vie0008.pdf
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Paper provided by University of Vienna, Department of Economics in its series Vienna Economics Papers with number 0008.

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Date of creation: Oct 2000
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Handle: RePEc:vie:viennp:0008

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Kandori Michihiro & Rob Rafael, 1995. "Evolution of Equilibria in the Long Run: A General Theory and Applications," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 383-414, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Fernando Vega-Redondo, 1997. "The Evolution of Walrasian Behavior," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(2), pages 375-384, March.
    Other versions:
  3. Alos-Ferrer, Carlos & Ania, Ana B. & Schenk-Hoppe, Klaus Reiner, 2000. "An Evolutionary Model of Bertrand Oligopoly," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 1-19, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Carlos ALO & S-FERRER, 1998. "Individual Randomness in Economic Models with a Continuum of Agents," Vienna Economics Papers vie9807, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
  5. Alos-Ferrer, C., 1998. "Individual Randomness in Economic Models with a Continuum Agents," Papers 9807, Washington St. Louis - School of Business and Political Economy.
  6. Carlos Alós-Ferrer, 2000. "Learning, Memory, and Inertia," Vienna Economics Papers 0003, University of Vienna, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  7. Oechssler, Jorg, 1997. "An Evolutionary Interpretation of Mixed-Strategy Equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 21(1-2), pages 203-237, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  8. Boylan, Richard T., 1992. "Laws of large numbers for dynamical systems with randomly matched individuals," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 473-504, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Benaim, M. & Weibull, J.W., 2000. "Deterministic Approximation of Stochastic Evolution in Games," Papers 534, Industrial Institute for Economic and Social Research.
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  10. Alos-Ferrer, Carlos, 1999. "Dynamical Systems with a Continuum of Randomly Matched Agents," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 86(2), pages 245-267, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Alos-Ferrer, Carlos & Kirchsteiger, Georg & Walzl, Markus, 2006. "On the Evolution of Market Institutions: The Platform Design Paradox," CEPR Discussion Papers 5538, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Alos-Ferrer, Carlos & Kirchsteiger, Georg, 2006. "General Equilibrium and the Emergence of (Non) Market Clearing Trading Institutions," CEPR Discussion Papers 5795, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2008-8-18.

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