On the structural difference between the evolutionary approach of Young and that of Kandori, Mailath and Rob
AbstractWe provide robust examples of symmetric two-player coordination games in normal form that reveal that equilibrium selection by the evolutionary model of Young (1993) is essentially different from equilibrium selection by the evolutionary model of Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993).
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra in its series Economics Working Papers with number 477.
Date of creation: Jun 1999
Date of revision: Dec 1999
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Evolutionary learning; coordination games; equilibrium selection;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
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