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On the structural difference between the evolutionary approach of Young and that of Kandori, Mailath and Rob


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  • Hans Jorgen Jacobsen
  • Mogens Jensen
  • Brigitte Sloth


We provide robust examples of symmetric two-player coordination games in normal form that reveal that equilibrium selection by the evolutionary model of Young (1993) is essentially different from equilibrium selection by the evolutionary model of Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993).

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra in its series Economics Working Papers with number 477.

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Date of creation: Jun 1999
Date of revision: Dec 1999
Handle: RePEc:upf:upfgen:477

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Keywords: Evolutionary learning; coordination games; equilibrium selection;

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