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Financial Structure and Product Qualities Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Stylianos Perrakis () (Concordia University )
Christos Constantatos () (Department of Economics, University of Macedonia )
Jean Lefoll () (HEC, University of Geneva )
We examine the interaction between financial and microeconomic decisions in a differentiated duopoly where additional willingness-to-pay for high quality is uncertain. Product specification is endogenous. We consider two three-stage games, according to the order of moves: qualities-financial structure-prices and financial structure-qualities-prices. Once debt is contracted, the manager maximizes equity instead of total value. We find that in both games debt a) increases both prices and qualities but most likely reduces product differentiation due to rival quality response; b) reduces the value of the levered high quality firm because it increases the low quality. Moreover, c) the cost of debt is higher for the second game, implying that it is higher for projects using debt to finance a product’s development-cumcommercialization compared to those financing only the commercialization stage.
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Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of Macedonia in its series Discussion Paper Series with number
2008_15.
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Date of creation: Dec 2008Date of revision:
Dec 2008Handle: RePEc:mcd:mcddps:2008_15Contact details of provider: Web page: http://econlab.uom.gr/econdep/ More information through EDIRC
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Keywords: Vertical differentiation ; uncertainty ; financial structure ; leverage ; sequential quality choice. ; Find related papers by JEL classification: L00 - Industrial Organization - - General - - - General G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Capital and Ownership Structure
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