Risk-Neutral Monopolists are Variance-Averse

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Risk-Neutral Monopolists are Variance-Averse

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Roland Kirstein () (Faculty of Economics and Management, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg)

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Roland Kirstein

Abstract

If the production of a risk-neutral monopolist is in uenced by a random variable, then the expected pro t is decreasing in the variance of the production process.

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Paper provided by Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management in its series FEMM Working Papers with number 09012.

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Length: 4 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:mag:wpaper:09012

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ALL-2009-05-16 (All new papers)
NEP-RMG-2009-05-16 (Risk Management)
NEP-UPT-2009-05-16 (Utility Models & Prospect Theory)

References listed on IDEAS
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Edward P. Lazear & Sherwin Rosen, 1981. "Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts," NBER Working Papers 0401, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Lazear, Edward P & Rosen, Sherwin, 1981. "Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 841-64, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Gibbons, Robert, 1987. "Piece-Rate Incentive Schemes," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 5(4), pages 413-29, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Holden, Craig W. & Subrahmanyam, Avanidhar, 1994. "Risk aversion, imperfect competition, and long-lived information," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 44(1-2), pages 181-190. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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This page was last updated on 2009-11-30.

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