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Risk-Neutral Monopolists are Variance-Averse

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  • Roland Kirstein

    ()
    (Faculty of Economics and Management, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg)

Abstract

If the production of a risk-neutral monopolist is in uenced by a random variable, then the expected pro t is decreasing in the variance of the production process.

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File URL: http://www.ww.uni-magdeburg.de/fwwdeka/femm/a2009_Dateien/2009_12.pdf
File Function: First version, 2009
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management in its series FEMM Working Papers with number 09012.

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Length: 4 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:mag:wpaper:09012

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Keywords: Risk-aversion; correlated random variables; market power;

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  1. Edward P. Lazear & Sherwin Rosen, 1979. "Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts," NBER Working Papers 0401, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Gibbons, Robert, 1987. "Piece-Rate Incentive Schemes," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 5(4), pages 413-29, October.
  3. Isik, Murat, 2005. "Environmental regulation and the optimal location of the risk-averse firm under uncertainty," Environment and Development Economics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge University Press, vol. 10(04), pages 435-452, August.
  4. Holden, Craig W. & Subrahmanyam, Avanidhar, 1994. "Risk aversion, imperfect competition, and long-lived information," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 44(1-2), pages 181-190.
  5. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
  6. Serguei Kaniovski, 2003. "Risk-Averse Monopolist with Aspiration," WIFO Working Papers, WIFO 196, WIFO.
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