Household Allocations and Endogenous Information
AbstractThis paper tests for the endogeneity of one of the main elements separating different models of intrahousehold allocations, namely the household information set. Based on unusually rich data, I find that split migrant couples in the Nairobi slums invest considerable resources into information acquisition through visits, sibling and child monitoring, budget submissions, and marital search. I also find potentially substantial welfare losses when information acquisition becomes costly, not only through reduced remittances but more importantly as families opt for family migration into the slums. That households invest in information when there are welfare gains complements a large and growing literature that seeks to explain intrahousehold allocations through more complex modes of decision-making.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by CIRPEE in its series Cahiers de recherche with number 0827.
Date of creation: 2008
Date of revision:
Survey Methods; Household production and Intrahousehold Allocation; Marriage; Family Structure; Migration;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
- F15 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Economic Integration
- F17 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Forecasting and Simulation
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-09-29 (All new papers)
- NEP-DEV-2008-09-29 (Development)
- NEP-MIG-2008-09-29 (Economics of Human Migration)
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