Evidential equilibria in static games
AbstractUnder uncertainty about what others will do, evidence suggests that people often use evidential reasoning (ER), i.e., they assign diagnostic significance to their own actions in forming beliefs about the actions of others. ER successfully explains the evidence from many important games. We provide a formal theoretical framework for discussing ER by proposing evidential games and the relevant solution concept evidential equilibrium (EE). We derive the relation between a Nash equilibrium and an EE. We apply EE to several common games including the prisoners’ dilemma and oligopoly games.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, University of Leicester in its series Discussion Papers in Economics with number 12/15.
Date of creation: Jul 2012
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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-09-30 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2012-09-30 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HPE-2012-09-30 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2012-09-30 (Microeconomics)
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