Tuition fees and admission standards: how do public and private universities really compete for students?
AbstractWe study a market where two universities, a public and a private one, compete for students by setting admission standards. Students differ in ability and receive a wage premium for participating in higher education. This wage increases with the quality of the university attended. The private university maximizes profits, the public university maximizes welfare. We show that there is no "same-standard" equilibrium. In a specific example we show that multiple equilibria can exist. In one equilibrium the private university sets a higher admission standard, and in the other equilibrium the public university sets a higher admission standard.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, University of Leicester in its series Discussion Papers in Economics with number 06/6.
Date of creation: Apr 2006
Date of revision:
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Postal: Department of Economics University of Leicester, University Road. Leicester. LE1 7RH. UK
Phone: +44 (0)116 252 2887
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Web page: http://www2.le.ac.uk/departments/economics
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H42 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Private Goods
- H52 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Education
- I22 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Educational Finance; Financial Aid
- I23 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Higher Education; Research Institutions
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-04-22 (All new papers)
- NEP-EDU-2006-04-23 (Education)
- NEP-PBE-2006-04-24 (Public Economics)
- NEP-SOG-2006-04-25 (Sociology of Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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