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Le développement des transferts publics d'éducation et d'assurance vieillesse par génération en France : 1850-2000

Author

Listed:
  • Stéphane Zuber
  • Antoine Bommier
  • Jérôme Bourdieu
  • Akiko Suwa-Eisenmann

Abstract

Le système public de retraite par répartition est un pilier de l'Etat Providence en France. Il se traduit par des transferts financiers des générations jeunes et actives vers les générations plus âgées et inactives. Lontgemps donné pour l'expression même de la solidarité entre générations, ce système est aujourd'hui vivement critiqué tant dans le monde politique que par certains économistes. Le système est jugé pesant, inefficace et injuste : il imposerait le fardeau des taxes nécessaires au financement des retraites, aurait des effets très négatifs sur les capacités d'épargne mais aussi sur l'activité, induirait un impact défavorable sur la fécondité, entre autres. L'injustice la plus patente tient au fait que certaines générations bénéficieraient de retraites qu'elles n'auraient pas eu à financer (les économistes parlent dans ce cas de "free lunch"). Ce serait le cas pour les générations qui atteignent l'âge de la retraite au moment où le système se met en place, comme pour celles qui ont cotisé sur la base d'une mortalité qui s'est révélée plus faible ex post. Les générations qui, au contraire, financent ou devront financer ces retraites se trouvent ainsi lésées. Une grande partie de notre tâche a consisté à reconstituer les données permettant de calculer les bénéfices reçus et taxes payées chaque année par chaque classe d'âge au titre des transferts publics d'éducation et de retraite au cours du siècle et demi passé, sans toutefois chercher pour quelles raisons historiques de tels transferts ont été mis en place. Ces données sont ensuite agrégées pour donner une mesure synthétique des transferts selon une méthode qui s'apparente à celle des travaux de comptabilité générationnelle initiés par Auerbach, Kotlikoff et Gokhale (1991). Nous pouvons ainsi quantifier l'ampleur de la redistribution inter-générationnelle.

Suggested Citation

  • Stéphane Zuber & Antoine Bommier & Jérôme Bourdieu & Akiko Suwa-Eisenmann, 2005. "Le développement des transferts publics d'éducation et d'assurance vieillesse par génération en France : 1850-2000," Research Unit Working Papers 0508, Laboratoire d'Economie Appliquee, INRA.
    • Handle: RePEc:lea:leawpi:0508
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • N3 - Economic History - - Labor and Consumers, Demography, Education, Health, Welfare, Income, Wealth, Religion, and Philanthropy
    • J3 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs

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