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The Allocation of Jurisdiction in International Antitrust

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Author Info
Damien J. NEVEN
Lars-Hendrik RÖLLER

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Abstract

In this paper, we consider the organisation of international antitrust as an issue of institution design which involves a trade-off between an inadequate internalisation of external effects across jurisdictions and the risk of capture in a centralised agency. We focus on the first element of the trade-off and on merger control. We first point out that the current framework of public international law allows for wide discretion in the assertion of jurisdiction. We then consider various allocation of jurisdictions in a stylised model of international merger control which attempts to capture the essential features of the objectives being pursued and of the procedures being implemented in the major jurisdictions. We find that in this framework, much of the scope for conflict disappears. The fact that conflicts actually often arise in global industries must then be associated with the pursuit of objectives that antitrust authorities are not supposed to pursue. We also find that the allocation of jurisdiction matters surprisingly little for the final outcome.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP in its series Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) with number 9916.

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Length: 16 pages
Date of creation: Sep 1999
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in European Economic Review, vol. 44(4-6), May 2000, pp. 845-855
Handle: RePEc:lau:crdeep:9916

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Postal: Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP, Internef, CH-1015 Lausanne
Phone: ++41 21 692.33.64
Fax: ++41 21 692.33.65
Web page: http://www.hec.unil.ch/deep/publications-english/e-cahiers.htm

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Related research
Keywords: international antitrust; jurisdiction; merger control;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
L4 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies
K0 - Law and Economics - - General

Cited by:
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  1. Oliver Budzinski, 2006. "An Economic Perspective on the Jurisdictional Reform of the European Merger Control System," Marburg Working Papers on Economics 200608, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung). [Downloadable!]
  2. Cabral, Luís M B, 2003. "An Equilibrium Approach to International Merger Policy," CEPR Discussion Papers 3878, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Lars-Hendrik Röller & Christian Wey, 2002. "Merger Control in the New Economy," CIG Working Papers FS IV 02-02, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG). [Downloadable!]
  4. Oliver Budzinski, 2006. "Modernisierung der europäischen Wettbewerbsordnung: Werden die nationalen Wettbewerbspolitiken verdrängt?," Marburg Working Papers on Economics 200611, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung). [Downloadable!]
  5. Francesc Trillas, 2008. "Regulatory federalism in network industries," Working Papers 2008/8, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB). [Downloadable!]
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