The Allocation of Jurisdiction in International Antitrust
AbstractIn this paper, we consider the organisation of international antitrust as an issue of institution design which involves a trade-off between an inadequate internalisation of external effects across jurisdictions and the risk of capture in a centralised agency. We focus on the first element of the trade-off and on merger control. We first point out that the current framework of public international law allows for wide discretion in the assertion of jurisdiction. We then consider various allocation of jurisdictions in a stylised model of international merger control which attempts to capture the essential features of the objectives being pursued and of the procedures being implemented in the major jurisdictions. We find that in this framework, much of the scope for conflict disappears. The fact that conflicts actually often arise in global industries must then be associated with the pursuit of objectives that antitrust authorities are not supposed to pursue. We also find that the allocation of jurisdiction matters surprisingly little for the final outcome.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP in its series Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) with number 9916.
Length: 16 pages
Date of creation: Sep 1999
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in European Economic Review, vol. 44(4-6), May 2000, pp. 845-855
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP, Internef, CH-1015 Lausanne
Phone: ++41 21 692.33.64
Fax: ++41 21 692.33.05
Web page: http://www.hec.unil.ch/deep/publications/cahiers/series
More information through EDIRC
international antitrust; jurisdiction; merger control;
Other versions of this item:
- Neven, Damien J. & Roller, Lars-Hendrik, 2000. "The allocation of jurisdiction in international antitrust," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(4-6), pages 845-855, May.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Richardson, Martin, 1999. "Trade and Competition Policies: Concordia Discors?," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 51(4), pages 649-64, October.
- Farrell, J. & Shapiro, C., 1988.
"Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis,"
17, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Discussion Paper.
- Farrell, Joseph & Shapiro, Carl, 1988. "Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt0tp305nx, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro., 1988. "Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis," Economics Working Papers 8880, University of California at Berkeley.
- Barros, Pedro P. & Cabral, Luis, 1994. "Merger policy in open economies," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(5), pages 1041-1055, May.
- Salant, Stephen W & Switzer, Sheldon & Reynolds, Robert J, 1983. "Losses from Horizontal Merger: The Effects of an Exogenous Change in Industry Structure on Cournot-Nash Equilibrium," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(2), pages 185-99, May.
- Neugebauer, Andrea, 2002. "Divergierende Fallentscheidungen von Wettbewerbsbehörden: Institutionelle Hintergründe," Arbeitspapiere 26, Westfälsche Wilhelms-Universität Münster (WWU), Institut für Genossenschaftswesen.
- Luis M. B. Cabral, 2003.
"An Equilibrium Approach to International Merger Policy,"
03-25, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
- Cabral, Luis M.B., 2005. "An equilibrium approach to international merger policy," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 23(9-10), pages 739-751, December.
- Cabral, Luís M B, 2003. "An Equilibrium Approach to International Merger Policy," CEPR Discussion Papers 3878, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Lars-Hendrik Röller & Christian Wey, 2002. "Merger Control in the New Economy," CIG Working Papers FS IV 02-02, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
- Cabral, Luis M. B., 2003. "International merger policy coordination," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 21-30, January.
- Zago, Angelo M. & Pick, Daniel H., 2004. "Labeling Policies in Food Markets: Private Incentives, Public Intervention, and Welfare Effects," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 29(01), April.
- Oliver Budzinski, 2006. "An Economic Perspective on the Jurisdictional Reform of the European Merger Control System," Marburg Working Papers on Economics 200608, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
- Francesc Trillas, 2008. "Regulatory federalism in network industries," Working Papers 2008/8, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
- Oliver Budzinski, 2006. "Modernisierung der europäischen Wettbewerbsordnung: Werden die nationalen Wettbewerbspolitiken verdrängt?," Marburg Working Papers on Economics 200611, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
- Siroën, Jean-Marc, 2002. "Politique(s) de la concurrence dans une économie globale," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/6628, Paris Dauphine University.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Claudine Delapierre Saudan).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.