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Are Voluntary Agreements Better? Evidence from Baseball Arbitration

Author

Listed:
  • Budd, John W.

    (University of Minnesota)

  • Sojourner, Aaron

    (Upjohn Institute for Employment Research)

  • Jung, Jaewoo

    (Korea Labor Institute)

Abstract

This paper empirically examines the widespread belief that voluntarily negotiated agreements produce better long-run relationships than third-party imposed settlements, such as arbitrator decisions or court judgments. Two key outcomes are analyzed – subsequent player performance and the durability of club-player relationship. Major League Baseball provides a compelling setting for these analyses because individual performance is well measured, there is the possibility of relationship breakdown, and both voluntary and imposed settlements are routinely used. While the results clearly show that a third-party imposed settlement is not better than a voluntary one, the evidence in support of the widespread belief is mixed.

Suggested Citation

  • Budd, John W. & Sojourner, Aaron & Jung, Jaewoo, 2014. "Are Voluntary Agreements Better? Evidence from Baseball Arbitration," IZA Discussion Papers 8098, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
  • Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp8098
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Paul L. Burgess & Daniel R. Marburger, 1993. "Do Negotiated and Arbitrated Salaries Differ under Final-Offer Arbitration?," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 46(3), pages 548-559, April.
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    5. John D. Burger & Stephen J.K. Walters, 2005. "Arbitrator Bias and Self-Interest: Lessons from the Baseball Labor Market," Journal of Labor Research, Transaction Publishers, vol. 26(2), pages 267-280, January.
    6. James R. Chelius & James B. Dworkin, 1980. "An Economic Analysis of Final-Offer Arbitration as a Conflict Resolution Device," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 24(2), pages 293-310, June.
    7. Kahn, Lawrence M, 1993. "Free Agency, Long-Term Contracts and Compensation in Major League Baseball: Estimates from Panel Data," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 75(1), pages 157-164, February.
    8. Brian P. McCall, 1990. "Interest Arbitration and the Incentive to Bargain," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 34(1), pages 151-167, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Bradley R. Weinberg, 2020. "Third-Party Intervention and the Preservation of Bargaining Relationships," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 73(2), pages 498-527, March.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    salary; negotiation; arbitration; dispute resolution; sports; baseball;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J52 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation
    • M12 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
    • M5 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics

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