The Italian Job: Match Rigging, Career Concerns and Media Concentration in Serie A
AbstractThis paper contributes to the literature on competition and corruption, by drawing on records from Calciopoli, a judicial inquiry carried out in 2006 on corruption in the Italian soccer league. Unlike previous studies, we can estimate the determinants of match rigging and use this information in identifying corruption episodes in years in which there are no pending judicial inquiries. We find evidence of corruption activity well before Calciopoli. Career concerns of referees seem to play a major role in match rigging. An implication of our study is that a more transparent selection of the referees and evaluation of their performance is essential in removing incentives to match rigging. Another implication is that in presence of significant "winners-take-all" effects, more competitive balance may increase corruption unless media concentration is also significantly reduced.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 3745.
Length: 48 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2008
Date of revision:
Publication status: published as "Match rigging and the career concerns of referees" in: Labour Economics, 2011, 18(3), 349-359
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- L82 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Entertainment; Media
- L83 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Sports; Gambling; Recreation; Tourism
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-10-21 (All new papers)
- NEP-DCM-2008-10-21 (Discrete Choice Models)
- NEP-LAB-2008-10-21 (Labour Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2008-10-21 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
- NEP-SPO-2008-10-21 (Sports & Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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