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Corruption in economic development - beneficial grease, minor annoyance, or major obstacle?

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Author Info
Shang-Jin Wei

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Abstract

The author reviews the overwhelming statistical evidence that countries with high levels of corruption experience poor economic performance. Corruption hinders economic development by reducing domestic investment, discouraging foreign direct investment, encouraging overspending in government, and distorting the composition of government spending (away from education, health, and infrastructure maintenance toward less efficient but more manipulable public projects). The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, among others, define corruption as"the abuse of public office for private gains". Whenever a public office is abused, a public function or objective is set aside and compromised. Only if a public function is unproductive are policy goals unharmed by corruption. But one often hears that bribery greases the machinery of commerce, so the author studied the evidence - which clearly rejects the hypothesis. Culture shapes the difference between a"bribe"and a"gift"but culturally induced differences seem small. There is no evidence to support the notion that corruption in Asia, including East Asia, entails lesser consequences. Corruption can be symptomatic of many social ills so the fight against it must be multifaceted. Laws and law enforcement are indispensable, but countries serious about fighting corruption should also reform government's role in the economy, especially in areas that (by giving officials discretionary power) are hotbeds of corruption. Recruiting and promoting civil servants on the basis of merit and paying them a salary competitive with similar jobs in the private sector helps attract moral, high-quality civil servants. International pressure on corrupt countries, and also to criminalize the bribing of foreign officials by multinational firms, can be useful. But anti-corruption campaigns cannot succeed without reforming domestic institutions in the corrupt countries.

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Paper provided by The World Bank in its series Policy Research Working Paper Series with number 2048.

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Date of creation: 28 Feb 1999
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Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:2048

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Related research
Keywords: Poverty Monitoring&Analysis; Corruption&Anitcorruption Law; Legal Products; Decentralization; Public Sector Corruption&Anticorruption Measures; National Governance; Governance Indicators; Legal Products; Corruption&Anitcorruption Law; Public Sector Corruption&Anticorruption Measures;

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Paolo Mauro, 1996. "The Effects of Corruption on Growth, Investment, and Government Expenditure," IMF Working Papers 96/98, International Monetary Fund.
  2. Caroline van Rijckeghem & Beatrice Weder, 1997. "Corruption and the Rate of Temptation - Do Low Wages in the Civil Service Cause Corruption?," IMF Working Papers 97/73, International Monetary Fund.
  3. Daniel Kaufmann & Shang-Jin Wei, 1999. "Does "Grease Money" Speed Up the Wheels of Commerce?," NBER Working Papers 7093, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Lindbeck, Assar, 1998. "Swedish Lessons for Post-Socialist Countries," Working Paper Series 498, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    Other versions:
  5. Ades, Alberto & Di Tella, Rafael, 1997. "National Champions and Corruption: Some Unpleasant Interventionist Arithmetic," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 107(443), pages 1023-42, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Hamid Reza Davoodi & Vito Tanzi, 1997. "Corruption, Public Investment, and Growth," IMF Working Papers 97/139, International Monetary Fund.
  7. Lui, Francis T, 1985. "An Equilibrium Queuing Model of Bribery," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(4), pages 760-81, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Krueger, Anne O, 1974. "The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 64(3), pages 291-303, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1993. "Corruption," NBER Working Papers 4372, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Rauch, James E. & Evans, Peter B., 2000. "Bureaucratic structure and bureaucratic performance in less developed countries," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 49-71, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Pranab Bardhan, 1997. "Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 35(3), pages 1320-1346, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Sanjeev Gupta, 1998. "Does Corruption Affect Income Inequality and Poverty?," IMF Working Papers 98/76, International Monetary Fund.
  13. Mauro, Paolo, 1995. "Corruption and Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 110(3), pages 681-712, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Shang-Jin Wei, 1997. "How Taxing is Corruption on International Investors?," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 63, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Stephen M. Ross Business School. [Downloadable!]
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  15. Bliss, Christopher & Di Tella, Rafael, 1997. "Does Competition Kill Corruption?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(5), pages 1001-23, October.
  16. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1994. "Politicians and Firms," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 109(4), pages 995-1025, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Rose-Ackerman, Susan, 1975. "The economics of corruption," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 187-203, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Hellman, Joel S. & Jones, Geraint & Kaufmann, Daniel & Schankerman, Mark, 2000. "Measuring governance, corruption, and State capture - how firms and bureaucrats shape the business environment in transition economies," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2312, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Natasha Hamilton-Hart, 2001. "Anti-Corruption Strategies In Indonesia," Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 37(1), pages 65-82, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Gonzalez, Eduardo T. & Mendoza, Magdalena L., . "Governance in Southeast Asia: Issues and Options," Discussion Papers DP 2002-07, Philippine Institute for Development Studies. [Downloadable!]
  4. Hellman, Joel S. & Jones, Geraint & Kaufmann, daniel, 2000. ""Seize the state, seize the day": state capture, corruption, and influence in transition," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2444, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
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