We show that, contrary to widespread belief, low-pay workers do not generally prefer that the minimum wage rate be increased until the labor demand is unitary elastic. Rather, there exists a critical value of elasticity of labor demand so that increases in the minimum wage rate make low-pay workers better off for higher elasticities, but worse off for lower elasticities. This critical value decreases with unemployment benefits and increases with workers’ risk aversion. We also show that in some countries the benefits for long-term unemployed are so low that workers would probably prefer that the minimum wage rate be decreased.
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Paper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number
3150.
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Clark, Andrew E & Georgellis, Yannis & Sanfey, Peter, 2001.
"Scarring: The Psychological Impact of Past Unemployment,"
Economica,
London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 68(270), pages 221-41, May.
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Addison, John T. & Blackburn, McKinley L., 1998.
"Minimum Wages and Poverty,"
ZEW Discussion Papers
98-42, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
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