Contrary to widespread belief, we show that low-pay workers might not generally prefer that the minimum wage rate be increased to a level where the labor demand is unitary elastic. Rather, there exists a critical value of elasticity of labor demand such that increases in the minimum wage rate make low-pay workers better off for higher elasticities, but worse off for lower elasticities. We demonstrate that the critical value decreases with the workers’ incomeequivalent wage rate and increases with their risk aversion. It is also shown that there may not exist an optimal minimum wage rate, and if it does exist, may not be unique.
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Paper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number
2360.
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Addison, John T. & Blackburn, McKinley L., 1998.
"Minimum Wages and Poverty,"
ZEW Discussion Papers
98-42, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
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