Effects Of Tax Reforms In A Shirking Model With Union Bargaining
AbstractIn this paper we introduce a progressive income tax in the shirking model with union bargaining presented by in Altenburg and Straub (2002). Indeed, we differentiate taxation on employees and employers for the fiscal policy analysis. The main results show that it is possible, with a constant revenue reform, to enhance employment by shifting the tax imposition towards lower firm taxation. And, that it is crucial to consider a proportional or progressive taxation on labour income in order to be able to analyse the effect on unemployment for a constant replacement rate.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) in its series Working Papers. Serie AD with number 2004-42.
Length: 21 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2004
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published by Ivie
Labour taxation; union bargaining; efficiency wages;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- E24 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Employment; Unemployment; Wages; Intergenerational Income Distribution
- J32 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Nonwage Labor Costs and Benefits; Retirement Plans; Private Pensions
- J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
- J51 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-02-19 (All new papers)
- NEP-MAC-2006-02-19 (Macroeconomics)
- NEP-PBE-2006-02-19 (Public Economics)
- NEP-PUB-2006-02-19 (Public Finance)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Koskela, Erkki & Schob, Ronnie, 1999.
"Does the composition of wage and payroll taxes matter under Nash bargaining?,"
Elsevier, vol. 64(3), pages 343-349, September.
- Koskela, E. & Schob, R., 1998. "Does the Composition of Wage and Payroll Taxes Matter Under Nash Bargaining," University of Helsinki, Department of Economics 443, Department of Economics.
- Erkki Koskela & Ronnie Schöb, 1999. "Does the Composition of Wage and Payroll Taxes Matter Under Nash Bargaining?," Discussion Papers 203, Government Institute for Economic Research Finland (VATT).
- Hoel, Michael, 1989. "Efficiency wages and local versus central wage bargaining," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 175-179, August.
- Picard, Pierre M & Toulemonde, Eric, 2001.
"On the Equivalence of Taxes Paid by Employers and Employees,"
Scottish Journal of Political Economy,
Scottish Economic Society, vol. 48(4), pages 461-70, September.
- Picard, P.M. & Toulemonde, E., 1999. "On the Equivalence of Taxes Paid by Employers and Employees," Papers 215, Notre-Dame de la Paix, Sciences Economiques et Sociales.
- Christopher A. Pissarides, 1997.
"The Impact of Employment Tax Cuts on Unemployment and Wages: The Role of Unemployment Benefits and Tax Structure,"
CEP Discussion Papers
dp0361, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
- Pissarides, Christopher A., 1998. "The impact of employment tax cuts on unemployment and wages; The role of unemployment benefits and tax structure," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 155-183, January.
- Sorensen, Peter Birch, 1999. "Optimal tax progressivity in imperfect labour markets," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 435-452, September.
- Garino, Gaia & Martin, Christopher, 2000.
"Efficiency wages and union-firm bargaining,"
Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 181-185, November.
- Shapiro, Carl & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1984. "Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 433-44, June.
- Altenburg, Lutz & Straub, Martin, 1998. "Efficiency Wages, Trade Unions, and Employment," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 50(4), pages 726-46, October.
- Andersen, Torben M. & Sandemann Rasmussen, Bo, 1999. "Effort, taxation and unemployment1," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 97-103, January.
- Laszlo Goerke, 2002. "Statutory and economic incidence of labour taxes," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 9(1), pages 17-20.
- Fuest, Clemens & Huber, Bernd, 2000. "Is tax progression really good for employment? A model with endogenous hours of work," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 79-93, January.
- Sanfey, Peter J., 1993. "On the interaction between efficiency wages and union-firm bargaining models," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 41(3), pages 319-324.
- Koskela, Erkki & Vilmunen, Jouko, 1996. "Tax progression is good for employment in popular models of trade union behaviour," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 65-80, August.
- Erkki Koskela & Ronnie Schöb, 2007.
"Tax Progression under Collective Wage Bargaining and Individual Effort Determination,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
2024, CESifo Group Munich.
- Erkki Koskela & Ronnie Schöb, 2012. "Tax Progression under Collective Wage Bargaining and Individual Effort Determination," Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(3), pages 749-771, 07.
- Koskela, Erkki & Schöb, Ronnie, 2006. "Tax progression under collective wage bargaining and individual effort determination," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2006-13, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Departamento de Edición).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.