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The Rule Incentives that Rule Civil Justice

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  • Daniela Marchesi

    (ISAE - Institute for Studies and Economic Analyses)

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    Abstract

    The excessive length of civil judicial proceedings may be understood being the consequence of a disequilibrium between demand and supply of justice. A comparison between EU countries and a statistical and analytical investigation demonstrates that the problems do not rest in insufficient supply – which has been the general opinion – but in pathological demand for civil justice. Opportunistic behaviour incentivized by the procedural rules and by the excessive length of trials is at the root of such demand. Therefore changing the formula which determines lawyer’s fees should be the first reform introduced.

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    File URL: http://lipari.istat.it/digibib/Working_Papers/WP_85_2007_Marchesi.pdf
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by ISTAT - Italian National Institute of Statistics - (Rome, ITALY) in its series ISAE Working Papers with number 85.

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    Length: 36 pages
    Date of creation: Nov 2007
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:isa:wpaper:85

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    Related research

    Keywords: Efficiency of civil justice; Comparison among EU countries and the Italian case; Supply of justice; Pathological demand of civil justice; Effectiveness of reforms;

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    1. Cooter, Robert D & Rubinfeld, Daniel L, 1989. "Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 27(3), pages 1067-97, September.
    2. Beckner, Clinton III & Katz, Avery, 1995. "The incentive effects of litigation fee shifting when legal standards are uncertain," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 205-224, June.
    3. Rosenberg, D. & Shavell, S., 1985. "A model in which suits are brought for their nuisance value," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 3-13, June.
    4. Steven Shavell, 1981. "Suit and Settlement vs. Trial: A Theoretical Analysis under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs," NBER Working Papers 0662, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Bebchuk, Lucian Arye, 1988. "Suing Solely to Extract a Settlement Offer," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 17(2), pages 437-50, June.
    6. Hughes, James W & Snyder, Edward A, 1995. "Litigation and Settlement under the English and American Rules: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 38(1), pages 225-50, April.
    7. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Howard F. Chang, 1994. "An Analysis of Fee-Shifting Based on the Margin of Victory: On FrivolousSuits, Meritorious Suits and the Role of Rule 11," NBER Working Papers 4731, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Gravelle, H. S. E., 1993. "The efficiency implications of cost-shifting rules," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 3-18, March.
    9. Snyder, Edward A & Hughes, James W, 1990. "The English Rule for Allocating Legal Costs: Evidence Confronts Theory," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(2), pages 345-80, Fall.
    10. Katz, Avery, 1990. "The effect of frivolous lawsuits on the settlement of litigation," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 3-27, May.
    11. Cohen, Mark A., 1992. "The motives of judges: Empirical evidence from antitrust sentencing," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 13-30, March.
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