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Litigation and Settlement under the English and American Rules: Theory and Evidence

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Author Info
Hughes, James W
Snyder, Edward A

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Abstract

In contrast to the American rule, whereby each party bears its own costs, the English rule requires losers at trial to pay the winner's legal fees, up to a reasonable limit. We develop six hypotheses regarding how these two cost-allocation rules might affect settlements and litigated outcomes through changes in (1) the selection of cases reaching the settle-versus-litigate stage and (2) behavior thereafter. Using data from Florida, which applied the English rule to medical malpractice claims during the period 1980-85, we examine the rules' effects on the probability of plaintiffs' winning at trial, jury awards, and out-of-court settlements. The English rule increased plaintiff success rates at trial, average jury awards, and out-of-court settlements. Our interpretation of these findings emphasizes that the overall quality of the claims reaching the settle-versus-litigate stage must improve to generate the combination of effects observed. Copyright 1995 by the University of Chicago.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Law & Economics.

Volume (Year): 38 (1995)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
Pages: 225-50
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Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlawec:v:38:y:1995:i:1:p:225-50

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  1. Michael R. Baye & Dan Kovenock & Casper G. de Vries, 2004. "Comparative Analysis of Litigation Systems: An Auction-Theoretic Approach," Working Papers 2004-24, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Christopher C. Klein, 2007. "Anticompetitive Litigation and Antitrust Liability," Working Papers 200713, Middle Tennessee State University, Department of Economics and Finance. [Downloadable!]
  3. Paul Klemperer, 2000. "Why Every Economist Should Learn Some Auction Theory," Microeconomics 0004009, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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  4. David Encaoua & François Laisney & Jacques Mairesse, 1998. "Foreword," Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, ADRES, issue 49-50, pages 02, Janvier-J. [Downloadable!]
  5. Bertrand Chopard & Thomas Cortade & Eric Langlais, 2008. "Trial and settlement negotiations between asymmetrically skilled parties," EconomiX Working Papers 2008-32, University of Paris West - Nanterre la Défense, EconomiX. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Jean Lanjouw & Josh Lerner, 1998. "The Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights: A Survey of the Empirical Literature," Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, ADRES, issue 49-50, pages 09, Janvier-J. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Jean O Lanjouw & Josh Lerner, 2004. "The Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights: A Survey of the Literature," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000000486, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
  8. Hans-Bernd Schaefer, 2000. "The Bundling of Similar Interests in Litigation. The Incentives for Class Action and Legal Actions taken by Associations," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 9(3), pages 183-213, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Daniela Marchesi, 2007. "The Rule Incentives that Rule Civil Justice," ISAE Working Papers 85, ISAE - Institute for Studies and Economic Analyses - (Rome, ITALY). [Downloadable!]
  10. David Encaoua & François Laisney & Jacques Mairesse, 1998. "Avant-propos," Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, ADRES, issue 49-50, pages 01, Janvier-J. [Downloadable!]
  11. Virginia Rosales-López, 2008. "Economics of court performance: an empirical analysis," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 25(3), pages 231-251, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Michael R. Baye & Dan Kovenock & Casper G. de Vries, 2000. "Comparative Analysis of Litigation Systems: An Auction-Theoretic Approach," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 00-103/2, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
  13. Peter Van Wijck & Ben Van Velthoven, 2000. "An Economic Analysis of the American and the Continental Rule for Allocating Legal Costs," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 9(2), pages 115-125, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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