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The motives of judges: Empirical evidence from antitrust sentencing Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Cohen, Mark A.
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal International Review of Law and Economics .
Volume (Year): 12 (1992)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Pages: 13-30
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Handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:12:y:1992:i:1:p:13-30Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/irle
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