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Equalization transfers and convergence between federal and unitary systems: a contribution to their historical analysis

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  • Giorgio Brosio

    (Università di Torino)

Abstract

Equalization transfers, or grants, are a crucial component of modern federal and unitary countries. They also shape the evolution of different political systems promoting convergence in their effective working. The literature does not provide studies with a long-term and comparative perspective despite the relevance of this approach to the study of intergovernmental relations. The paper provides a contribution aimed at filling this void. It considers a small set of countries, including two unitary systems, Italy and the UK with a focus on English local government and three federal countries, Australia, Canada, and the United States. Federal systems are paying now more attention than initially to uniformity of policies and equality of access to the benefits of public policies, while unitary systems show now much more attention than in the past to reaching equality of access and benefits from policies through local autonomy and use of transparent intergovernmental grants, rather than with hierarchical command. Another way of illustrating this process is stressing the growing recognition of common citizenship in both federal and unitary states.

Suggested Citation

  • Giorgio Brosio, 2017. "Equalization transfers and convergence between federal and unitary systems: a contribution to their historical analysis," Working papers 61, Società Italiana di Economia Pubblica.
  • Handle: RePEc:ipu:wpaper:61
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Evolution of intergovernmental relations; equalization transfers; political institutions;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism

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