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O Tamanho do Setor Público no Contexto do Federalismo: Um Modelo Aplicado aos Municípios Brasileiros

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  • Roberta da Silva Vieira

Abstract

O presente trabalho teve como objetivo explorar as teorias existentes sobre o tamanho do setor público com a finalidade de se aplicar aos municípios brasileiros. O modelo teórico utilizado pressupõe que existem apenas dois setores na economia: o setor público e o setor privado. Este recebe choques de produtividade enquanto aquele funciona em um ambiente não estocástico, porém de forma menos eficiente. Entretanto, ambos produzem o mesmo bem. Por outro lado, o agente representativo maximiza a sua função utilidade, a qual depende do consumo dos bens público e privado. Admite-se a existência do setor público mesmo com a sua ineficiência, pois é dessa forma que o agente representativo irá amenizar variações bruscas na sua função utilidade. A técnica econométrica de dados em painel com o uso de variáveis instrumentais foi escolhida para a aplicação empírica. Os resultados são: o tamanho do setor público municipal é positivamente correlacionado com a esperança das transferências intergovernamentais; negativamente correlacionado com a variância e esperança do produto privado; e a covariância entre produto privado e transferências intergovernamentais é estatisticamente insignificante. Além da aplicação quantitativa aos dados das finanças municipais, a principal contribuição deste trabalho foi a adaptação de um modelo para explicar o tamanho do setor público local, incorporando as questões federativas. The present work aims to explore the existing theories about the size of the public sector and test empirically in Brazilian municipalities. The theoretical model assumes that the economy has only two sectors: the public and the private. The latter receives productivity shocks while the former operates in a non-stochastic environment but in a less efficient production process. Both sectors produce the same goods. In addition, the representative agent maximizes his utility function which depends on the consumption of both public and private goods. The public sector exists despite of its inefficiency, because the representative agent needs to smooth abrupt variations in his utility function. Panel data with the use of instrumental variables was chosen to the empirical application. The results are: the size of the local public sector in Brazil is positively correlated with the expected value of intergovernmental grants; negatively correlated with the expected value of private output and the variance of private output; statistically uncorrelated with the covariance between private output and intergovernmental grants. Besides the quantitative analysis to municipalities’ financial data, the major contribution of this work was the adaptation of a model to explain the size of local public sector, embodying federative issues.

Suggested Citation

  • Roberta da Silva Vieira, 2009. "O Tamanho do Setor Público no Contexto do Federalismo: Um Modelo Aplicado aos Municípios Brasileiros," Discussion Papers 1415, Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada - IPEA.
  • Handle: RePEc:ipe:ipetds:1415
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    3. Mueller,Dennis C., 2003. "Public Choice III," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521894753.
    4. Thomas A. Garrett & Russell M. Rhine, 2006. "On the size and growth of government," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, vol. 88(Jan), pages 13-30.
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