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Escalamiento de cargos de acceso e incentivos a la predación de un operador de telefonía local integrado verticalmente

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Author Info

  • Fernando Coloma

    ()
    (Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile.)

  • Juan Pablo Montero.

Abstract

En este artículo se discuten los efectos de escalar los cargos de acceso por sobre los costos marginales en los incentivos de un operador de telefonía local integrado verticalmente a implementar una práctica de precios predatorios en algunos de los servicios desregulados (e.g., larga distancia, internet). Utilizando un modelo de Hotelling de competencia en precios entre dos empresas, encontramos que los incentivos a la predación caen con el escalamiento. Aunque el escalamiento hace menos costosa la predación, éste a su vez, hace menos atractiva la predación, ya que las utilidades de las empresas en el equilibrio duopólico son mayores. Este último efecto siempre domina al efecto de menor costo.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. in its series Documentos de Trabajo with number 361.

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Date of creation: 2009
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Handle: RePEc:ioe:doctra:361

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  1. Blass, Asher A & Carlton, Dennis W, 2001. "The Choice of Organizational Form in Gasoline Retailing and the Cost of Laws That Limit That Choice," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 44(2), pages 511-24, October.
  2. Biglaiser, Gary & DeGraba, Patrick, 2001. "Downstream Integration by a Bottleneck Input Supplier Whose Regulated Wholesale Prices Are Above Costs," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(2), pages 302-15, Summer.
  3. Bolton, Patrick & Scharfstein, David S, 1990. "A Theory of Predation Based on Agency Problems in Financial Contracting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 93-106, March.
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