Performance evaluation in competitive REE models
AbstractOur basic premise is that fund managers performance is related to superior information about an asset payoff. We investigate the relationship between managerial skills and trading behavior within a two-period rational expectation equilibrium (REE) model where agents trade on private information in the first round, while a public signal arrives at the second date that makes traders revise their beliefs and retrade. The public signal can be related to the asset payoff, or to variables not related to fundamentals (noise), or both. We characterize the unique partially revealing REE and explore the drivers of price dynamics and trading behavior. Our main prediction is that good managers are contrarian traders, while bad managers are momentum traders when public news arrive to the market. Furthermore, the change in holdings of each type of trader is monotonic on the traders' skills. Based on these predictions, we propose new performance evaluation measures that rely on the manager's change in holdings around the arrival of public news rather than his past performance. A byproduct of our analysis is the proposal of a new protocol for performance evaluation and Due Diligence (DD) procedures.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales in its series Working Papers with number 2010-21.
Date of creation: 18 Oct 2010
Date of revision:
REE; performance evaluation; mutual fund; hedge funds; talent; informed traders; due diligence;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- G11 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Portfolio Choice; Investment Decisions
- G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing
- G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-10-23 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2010-10-23 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-MST-2010-10-23 (Market Microstructure)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Jackwerth, Jens Carsten, 2000.
"Recovering Risk Aversion from Option Prices and Realized Returns,"
Review of Financial Studies,
Society for Financial Studies, vol. 13(2), pages 433-51.
- Jens Carsten Jackwerth, 1998. "Recovering Risk Aversion from Option Prices and Realized Returns," Finance 9803002, EconWPA.
- Jens Carsten Jackwerth., 1996. "Recovering Risk Aversion from Option Prices and Realized Returns," Research Program in Finance Working Papers RPF-265, University of California at Berkeley.
- Carhart, Mark M, 1997. " On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(1), pages 57-82, March.
- Jose Marin & Rohit Rahi, 1996.
"Information Revelation and Market Incompleteness,"
Archive Working Papers
024, Birkbeck, Department of Economics, Mathematics & Statistics.
- Marcin Kacperczyk & Amit Seru, 2007. "Fund Manager Use of Public Information: New Evidence on Managerial Skills," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 62(2), pages 485-528, 04.
- Péter Kondor, 2009. "The more we know, the less we agree: Higher-order expectations and public announcements," 2009 Meeting Papers 1018, Society for Economic Dynamics.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (IMDEA RePEc Maintainer).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.