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Ambigüedad estratégica en contratos públicos de suministro

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  • Constanza M. Fosco Perea M

    ()
    (ILADES-Georgetown University, Universidad Alberto Hurtado.)

Abstract

En este trabajo se presenta, sobre la base de un modelo de intercambio entre agentes privados de Douglas Bernheim y Michael Whinston (1998), un contrato típico de suministro entre el gobierno y una firma privada, en un contexto dinámico y sin renegociación. La firma debe realizar inversiones (observables, no verificables) para mejorar la calidad o para reducir costos o ambos tipos. Los resultados obtenidos por Bernheim, D. y M. Whinston se aplican cuando el comprador es el gobierno benevolente, siempre que valore por igual las utilidades de los agentes privados y la recaudación de impuestos para pagar el bien no distorsione la asignación de recursos en otros mercados. Cuando la firma debe realizar inversiones para reducir costos, el contrato incompleto que sólo especifica todas las variables verificables es óptimo; y cuando la firma debe realizar inversiones para mejorar la calidad, es óptimo un contrato incompleto por ambigüedad estratégica (no incluye todas las variables verificables). Sin embargo, cuando se incorpora el supuesto de que la inversión en reducción de costos disminuye la calidad del bien, el contrato incompleto tradicional no es óptimo y se alcanza el first best con uno incompleto por ambigüedad estratégica. Lo mismo sucede cuando se combinan ambos modelos y la firma debe realizar ambos tipos de inversión, afecte o no la inversión en reducción de costos el nivel de calidad.

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Paper provided by Ilades-Georgetown University, Universidad Alberto Hurtado/School of Economics and Bussines in its series ILADES-Georgetown University Working Papers with number inv127.

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Handle: RePEc:ila:ilades:inv127

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