Managing the Public Debt in Fiscal Stabilizations: the Evidence
AbstractThis paper provides evidence on the behavior of public debt managers during fiscal stabilizations in OECD countries over the last two decades. We find that debt maturity tends to lengthen the more credible is the program, the lower is the long-term interest rate and the higher is the volatility of short-term interest rates. We show that this debt issuing strategy is consistent with optimal debt management if information bewteen the government and private investors is asymmetric, as it is usually the case at the outset of a stabilization attempt when private investors may lack full confidence in the announced budget cuts.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University in its series Working Papers with number 118.
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Other versions of this item:
- Alessandro Missale & Francesco Giavazzi & Pierpaolo Benigno, 1997. "Managing the Public Debt in Fiscal Stabilizations: The Evidence," NBER Working Papers 6311, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- E31 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Price Level; Inflation; Deflation
- E41 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Demand for Money
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-1998-11-20 (All new papers)
- NEP-CFN-1998-11-20 (Corporate Finance)
- NEP-PUB-1998-11-20 (Public Finance)
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