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Privatización en México

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  • Alberto Chong

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  • Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes

Abstract

(Disponible en idioma inglés únicamente) Durante los últimos 20 años, México ha redefinido el papel del Estado en su economía a través de un vigoroso programa de apertura del comercio, promoción de la eficiencia y reducción del tamaño y alcance del sector propiedad del Estado. La privatización condujo en México a una mejora significativa del desempeño del empresariado y la rentabilidad aumentó 24 puntos porcentuales, acercándose así a niveles comparables a los de las empresas privadas. Como máximo, cabe atribuir un 5% de ese aumento a un aumento de los precios y 31% a traspasos de trabajadores, mientras que el 64% restante representa incrementos de productividad. Hay elementos que indican que la privatización aporta otros beneficios sociales, tales como un mayor acceso a los servicios, que normalmente se producen a continuación de una privatización, y que conduce al mejoramiento de la asistencia social a los consumidores más pobres que compensan con creces cualquier aumento de los precios. Además, un aspecto de la privatización que se suele pasar por alto es el de sus efectos fiscales, en los que el producto de la venta se ve magnificado mediante la reducción de subsidios y el aumento de impuestos, y puede ayudar a pagar deuda o servir de fondos para el gasto social. El programa de privatización de México puede proporcionar una valiosa guía de lo que conviene y no conviene hacer en una privatización: En primer lugar, el proceso de privatización debe diseñarse cuidadosamente y ejecutarse de manera transparente. Hay requisitos especiales, tales como las prohibiciones de inversión extranjera directa o de pagos exclusivamente en efectivo, que conducen a descuentos considerables de los precios de las compañías vendidas, al tiempo que la simplicidad fomenta la competencia y conduce a precios más elevados. Además, un programa transparente puede contribuir a refrenar la tendencia de los políticos de favorecer a sus amigos mediante ajustes de las reglas del juego. En segundo lugar, la reestructuración de las empresas que se hallan en la antesala de su privatización resulta contraproducente para aumentar los precios netos de venta y por lo tanto se debe evitar. Los gobiernos invierten recursos considerables en inversiones políticamente motivadas o en programas de eficiencia que no son valorados por los postores y que rara vez se pueden justificar desde el punto de vista social desde el cual se promueven. Además, los programas de reestructuración alargan considerablemente el proceso de privatización y hacen bajar los precios de venta de las empresas; en el caso de México, cada mes de demora ocasiona una disminución de 2,2% del precio de venta. Por último, en este trabajo se sostiene que es fundamental desregular y volver a regular cuidadosamente a las empresas privatizadas, a fin de asegurar que se comporten adecuadamente, así como para proporcionar un marco de conducción empresarial que permita que las compañías financien sus operaciones sin depender de la ayuda del gobierno.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department in its series Research Department Publications with number 4374.

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Date of creation: Aug 2004
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Handle: RePEc:idb:wpaper:4374

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  1. Jeffry M. Netter & William L. Megginson, 2001. "From State to Market: A Survey of Empirical Studies on Privatization," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 39(2), pages 321-389, June.
  2. Perotti, Enrico C, 1995. "Credible Privatization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(4), pages 847-59, September.
  3. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silane, 1997. "The Benefits of Privatization: Evidence from Mexico," NBER Working Papers 6215, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Ramirez, Miguel D., 1998. "Privatization and Regulatory Reform in Mexico and Chile: A Critical Overview," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 38(3, Part 1), pages 421-439.
  5. Barberis, Nicholas & Maxim Boycko & Andrei Shleifer & Natalia Tsukanova, 1996. "How Does Privatization Work? Evidence from the Russian Shops," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(4), pages 764-90, August.
  6. Bruno Biais & Enrico Perotti, 2002. "Machiavellian Privatization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(1), pages 240-258, March.
  7. Narjess Boubakri & Jean-Claude Cosset, 1998. "The Financial and Operating Performance of Newly Privatized Firms: Evidence from Developing Countries," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 53(3), pages 1081-1110, 06.
  8. Alberto Chong & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, 2003. "Privatization and Labor Force Restructuring Around the World," Research Department Publications 4329, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
  9. Richard B. Freeman, 1986. "Unionism Comes to the Public Sector," NBER Working Papers 1452, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Bazdresch P., Carlos & Elizondo, Carlos, 1993. "Privatization: The Mexican case," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 33(Supplemen), pages 45-66.
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  12. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silane & Guillermo Zamarripa, 2002. "Related Lending," NBER Working Papers 8848, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  13. John S. Earle & Scott Gelbach, 2002. "A Spoonful of Sugar: Privatization and Popular Support for Reform in the Czech Republic," Upjohn Working Papers and Journal Articles 02-79, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
  14. La Porta, Rafael & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Shleifer, Andrei, 2001. "Government Ownership of Banks," Working Paper Series rwp01-016, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
  15. Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Separation of Ownership and Control," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 301-25, June.
  16. K. Bayliss, 2002. "Privatization And Poverty: The Distributional Impact of Utility Privatization," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 73(4), pages 603-625, December.
  17. Bortolotti, Bernardo & Fantini, Marcella & Siniscalco, Domenico, 2001. "Privatisation: politics, institutions, and financial markets," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 2(2), pages 109-137, June.
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