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Colombia: Los problemas de competitividad de un país en conflicto

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  • Alberto Melo

Abstract

La persistencia del conflicto interno en Colombia inhibe todos los elementos principales que contribuyen a la determinación de la competitividad de la economía nacional, que son los siguientes: (i) el monto de sus recursos productivos; (ii) la calidad y productividad de los mismos; (iii) la eficiencia con que operan sus mercados; (iv) el estado de su infraestructura; (v) la capacidad de innovación tecnológica de sus empresas y la productividad de su sistema nacional de innovación; (vi) la percepción existente entre los inversionistas acerca de su estabilidad macroeconómica de largo plazo; (vii) la fortaleza de sus instituciones, y (viii) la percepción de los inversionistas acerca de su estabilidad política de largo plazo. Por consecuencia, los puntos que definen la agenda de temas cruciales para elevar la competitividad del país son los siguientes: i) la solución al conflicto interno; ii) la creación de un ambiente institucional favorable a la inversión y al crecimiento; iii) la restauración del equilibrio fiscal; iv) la transformación del sistema financiero y los mercados de capital en palancas efectivas de desarrollo; y v) la promoción de la innovación tecnológica y la adopción de nuevas tecnologías.

Suggested Citation

  • Alberto Melo, 2003. "Colombia: Los problemas de competitividad de un país en conflicto," Research Department Publications 1002, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
  • Handle: RePEc:idb:wpaper:1002
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