A Cantor Set of Games with No Shift-Homogeneous Equilibrium Selection
AbstractWe construct a continuum of games on a countable set of players that does not possess a measurable equilibrium selection that satisfies a natural homogeneity property. The explicit nature of the construction yields counterexamples to the existence of equilibria in models with overlapping generations and in games with a continuum of players.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem in its series Discussion Paper Series with number dp607.
Length: 17 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2012
Date of revision:
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-05-15 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2012-05-15 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2012-05-15 (Microeconomics)
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Economics Working Paper Archive
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