Mediators Enable Truthful Voting
AbstractThe Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem asserts the impossibility of designing a non-dictatorial voting rule in which truth-telling always constitutes a Nash equilibrium. We show that in voting games of complete information where a mediator is on hand, this troubling impossibility result can be alleviated. Indeed, we characterize families of voting rules where, given a mediator, truthful preference revelation is always in strong equilibrium. In particular, we observe that the family of feasible elimination procedures has the foregoing property.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem in its series Discussion Paper Series with number dp451.
Length: 11 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2007
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- NEP-ALL-2007-05-26 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2007-05-26 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2007-05-26 (Game Theory)
- NEP-POL-2007-05-26 (Positive Political Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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- Peleg,Bezalel, 2008.
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Cambridge University Press, number 9780521074650, October.
- Satterthwaite, Mark Allen, 1975. "Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 187-217, April.
- Bezalel Peleg & Ariel D. Procaccia, 2007.
"Implementation by Mediated Equilibrium,"
Discussion Paper Series
dp463, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
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