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The Optimal Design Of Elimination Tournaments With A Superstar

Author

Listed:
  • Daria Tabashnikova

    (National Research University Higher School of Economics)

  • Marina Sandomirskaia

    (National Research University Higher School of Economics)

Abstract

We study single- and double-elimination tournaments with heterogeneous players of two types: regular players and a superstar. Players choose efforts in each match with linear costs, winning with a probability calculated with the Tullock success function. We consider several designer maximization problems: total efforts, probability of winning the strongest player, and a weighted composed function. We show that a double-elimination tournament is less profitable in most cases, except when the tournament organizer is concerned about the probability that the superstar wins the tournament.

Suggested Citation

  • Daria Tabashnikova & Marina Sandomirskaia, 2023. "The Optimal Design Of Elimination Tournaments With A Superstar," HSE Working papers WP BRP 263/EC/2023, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:hig:wpaper:263/ec/2023
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    single-elimination tournament; double-elimination tournament; tournament design; heterogeneous players; superstar;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
    • Z20 - Other Special Topics - - Sports Economics - - - General

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