IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hig/wpaper/197-ec-2018.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

What Drives the Private Provision of Security: Evidence from Russian Regions

Author

Listed:
  • Natalia Vasilenok

    (National Research University Higher School of Economics)

Abstract

This paper studies the influence of institutional quality and income inequality on the private provision of security. It is argued that the effects of both factors are far from straightforward and should be thoroughly examined when variation in institutional quality and income inequality is high. To conduct empirical analysis, data on the regions of Russia between 2009 and 2016 are used. It is hypothesized and empirically supported that institutional quality affects the relationship between the private and public provision of security. Weak institutions make the private provision of security a substitute for the public provision of security, whereas strong institutions promote complementarity between the two. It is also shown that income inequality increases the private provision of security when inequality is low and decreases it when inequality is high. This result can be attributed to economies of scale.

Suggested Citation

  • Natalia Vasilenok, 2018. "What Drives the Private Provision of Security: Evidence from Russian Regions," HSE Working papers WP BRP 197/EC/2018, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:hig:wpaper:197/ec/2018
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://wp.hse.ru/data/2018/08/27/1154689126/197EC2018.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Frye, Timothy & Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina, 2000. "Rackets, Regulation, and the Rule of Law," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 16(2), pages 478-502, October.
    2. Baumann, Florian & Friehe, Tim, 2013. "Private protection against crime when property value is private information," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 73-79.
    3. Clotfelter, Charles T., 1978. "Private security and the public safety," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 388-402, July.
    4. Marco Gonzalez-Navarro, 2013. "Deterrence and Geographical Externalities in Auto Theft," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 5(4), pages 92-110, October.
    5. Paul Heaton & Priscillia Hunt & John MacDonald & Jessica Saunders, 2016. "The Short- and Long-Run Effects of Private Law Enforcement: Evidence from University Police," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(4), pages 889-912.
    6. Gary S. Becker & George J. Stigler, 1974. "Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 3(1), pages 1-18, January.
    7. Klick, Jonathan & Tabarrok, Alexander, 2005. "Using Terror Alert Levels to Estimate the Effect of Police on Crime," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 48(1), pages 267-279, April.
    8. Zimmerman, Paul R., 2014. "The deterrence of crime through private security efforts: Theory and evidence," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 66-75.
    9. Guha, Brishti, 2013. "Guns and crime revisited," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 1-10.
    10. Bergstrom, Theodore & Blume, Lawrence & Varian, Hal, 1986. "On the private provision of public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 25-49, February.
    11. Helsley, Robert W. & Strange, William C., 2005. "Mixed markets and crime," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(7), pages 1251-1275, July.
    12. Андриенко Ю.В., 2001. "В Поисках Объяснения Роста Преступности В России В Переходный Период: Криминометрический Подход," Higher School of Economics Economic Journal Экономический журнал Высшей школы экономики, CyberLeninka;Федеральное государственное автономное образовательное учреждение высшего образования «Национальный исследовательский университет «Высшая школа экономики», vol. 5(2), pages 194-220.
    13. Epple, Dennis & Romano, Richard E, 1996. "Public Provision of Private Goods," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(1), pages 57-84, February.
    14. Oleksiy Ivaschenko & Anton Nivorozhkin & Eugene Nivorozhkin, 2012. "The Role of Economic Crisis and Social Spending in Explaining Crime in Russia," Eastern European Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 50(4), pages 21-41, July.
    15. Günther G. Schulze & Bambang Suharnoko Sjahrir & Nikita Zakharov, 2016. "Corruption in Russia," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(1), pages 135-171.
    16. Juan Mendoza, 2015. "The protection of private property: the government as a free-rider," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 16(2), pages 179-205, May.
    17. Lacroix Guy & Narceau Nicolas, 1995. "Private Protection against Crime," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 72-87, January.
    18. Evans, William N. & Owens, Emily G., 2007. "COPS and crime," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(1-2), pages 181-201, February.
    19. Ian Ayres & Steven D. Levitt, 1998. "Measuring Positive Externalities from Unobservable Victim Precaution: An Empirical Analysis of Lojack," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 113(1), pages 43-77.
    20. Gans-Morse, Jordan, 2017. "Demand for Law and the Security of Property Rights: The Case of Post-Soviet Russia," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 111(2), pages 338-359, May.
    21. Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 1991. "Public Provision of Private Goods and the Redistribution of Income," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(4), pages 979-984, September.
    22. Aaron Chalfin & Justin McCrary, 2017. "Criminal Deterrence: A Review of the Literature," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 55(1), pages 5-48, March.
    23. Bowles, Roger & Garoupa, Nuno, 1997. "Casual police corruption and the economics of crime," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 75-87, March.
    24. Rafael Di Tella & Ernesto Schargrodsky, 2004. "Do Police Reduce Crime? Estimates Using the Allocation of Police Forces After a Terrorist Attack," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(1), pages 115-133, March.
    25. Libor Dušek, 2012. "Crime, Deterrence, and Democracy," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 13(4), pages 447-469, November.
    26. N. A. Vasilenok & A. M. Yarkin., 2018. "Who is in charge of security? Division of labour between public and private security producers," VOPROSY ECONOMIKI, N.P. Redaktsiya zhurnala "Voprosy Economiki", vol. 3.
    27. Jan C. Ours & Ben Vollaard, 2016. "The Engine Immobiliser: A Non‐starter for Car Thieves," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 126(593), pages 1264-1291, June.
    28. Vollaard, Ben & Koning, Pierre, 2009. "The effect of police on crime, disorder and victim precaution. Evidence from a Dutch victimization survey," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 336-348, December.
    29. Levitt, Steven D, 1997. "Using Electoral Cycles in Police Hiring to Estimate the Effect of Police on Crime," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(3), pages 270-290, June.
    30. Israel Marques II & Eugenia Nazrullaeva & Andrei Yakovlev, 2016. "Substituting Distribution for Growth: The Political Logic of Intergovernmental Transfers in the Russian Federation," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(1), pages 23-54, March.
    31. Cheung, Ron, 2008. "The interaction between public and private governments: An empirical analysis," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(3), pages 885-901, May.
    32. Nuno Garoupa & Daniel Klerman, 2002. "Optimal Law Enforcement with a Rent-Seeking Government," American Law and Economics Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 4(1), pages 116-140, January.
    33. Brian D. Taylor, 2014. "Police reform in Russia: the policy process in a hybrid regime," Post-Soviet Affairs, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 30(2-3), pages 226-255, May.
    34. Brooks, Leah & Strange, William C., 2011. "The micro-empirics of collective action: The case of business improvement districts," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(11), pages 1358-1372.
    35. Marselli, Riccardo & Vannini, Marco, 1997. "Estimating a crime equation in the presence of organized crime: Evidence from Italy," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 89-113, March.
    36. Ostrom, Elinor, 1996. "Crossing the great divide: Coproduction, synergy, and development," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 24(6), pages 1073-1087, June.
    37. Benson, Bruce L & Mast, Brent D, 2001. "Privately Produced General Deterrence," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 44(2), pages 725-746, October.
    38. Philip J. Cook & John MacDonald, 2011. "Public Safety through Private Action: an Economic Assessment of BIDS," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 121(552), pages 445-462, May.
    39. Varese, Federico, 2001. "The Russian Mafia: Private Protection in a New Market Economy," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198297369.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Tom Kirchmaier & Stephen Machin & Matteo Sandi & Robert Witt, 2020. "Prices, Policing and Policy: The Dynamics of Crime Booms and Busts," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 18(2), pages 1040-1077.
    2. Cheng, Cheng & Long, Wei, 2018. "Improving police services: Evidence from the French Quarter Task Force," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 164(C), pages 1-18.
    3. O’Flaherty, Brendan & Sethi, Rajiv, 2015. "Urban Crime," Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics, in: Gilles Duranton & J. V. Henderson & William C. Strange (ed.), Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics, edition 1, volume 5, chapter 0, pages 1519-1621, Elsevier.
    4. Zimmerman, Paul R., 2010. "Deterrence from self-protection measures in the ‘market model’ of crime: dynamic panel data estimates from employment in private security occupations," MPRA Paper 26187, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Christophe Bellégo & Joeffrey Drouard, 2019. "Does It Pay to Fight Crime? Evidence From the Pacification of Slums in Rio de Janeiro," Working Papers 2019-08, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
    6. Jesse Matheson & Brendon McConnell & James Rockey & Argyris Sakalis, 2023. "Do Remote Workers Deter Neighborhood Crime? Evidence from the Rise of Working from Home," Working Papers 2023020, The University of Sheffield, Department of Economics.
    7. Anna Bindler & Randi Hjalmarsson, 2021. "The Impact of the First Professional Police Forces on Crime [State Capacity and Economic Development: A Network Approach]," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 19(6), pages 3063-3103.
    8. Eide, Erling & Rubin, Paul H. & Shepherd, Joanna M., 2006. "Economics of Crime," Foundations and Trends(R) in Microeconomics, now publishers, vol. 2(3), pages 205-279, December.
    9. Aaron Chalfin & Benjamin Hansen & Rachel Ryley, 2019. "The Minimum Legal Drinking Age and Crime Victimization," NBER Working Papers 26051, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Blesse, Sebastian & Diegmann, André, 2022. "The place-based effects of police stations on crime: Evidence from station closures," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 207(C).
    11. Brishti Guha, 2015. "“Inferiority” complex? Policing, private precautions and crime," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 39(1), pages 97-106, February.
    12. Vikram Maheshri & Giovanni Mastrobuoni, 2018. "Do Security Measures Displace Crime? Theory and Evidence from Italian Bank Robberies," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 579, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
    13. Soeren C. Schwuchow, 2023. "Organized crime as a link between inequality and corruption," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 55(3), pages 469-509, June.
    14. Gregory De & Marina Toger & Sarit Weisburd, 2023. "Police Response Time and Injury Outcomes," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 133(654), pages 2147-2177.
    15. Zimmerman, Paul R., 2014. "The deterrence of crime through private security efforts: Theory and evidence," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 66-75.
    16. Blesse, Sebastian & Diegmann, André, 2019. "Police reorganization and crime: Evidence from police station closures," Working Papers 07/2019, German Council of Economic Experts / Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung.
    17. Ross Hickey & Steeve Mongrain & Joanne Roberts & Tanguy van Ypersele, 2021. "Private protection and public policing," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 23(1), pages 5-28, February.
    18. Cho, Sungwoo & Gonçalves, Felipe & Weisburst, Emily, 2021. "Do Police Make Too Many Arrests? The Effect of Enforcement Pullbacks on Crime," IZA Discussion Papers 14907, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    19. Blanes i Vidal, Jordi & Mastrobuoni, Giovanni, 2017. "Police Patrols and Crime," CEPR Discussion Papers 12266, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    20. Amodio, Francesco, 2019. "Crime protection investment spillovers: Theory and evidence from the City of Buenos Aires," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 159(C), pages 626-649.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    public goods; security; quality of institutions; income inequality.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
    • H44 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Goods: Mixed Markets
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hig:wpaper:197/ec/2018. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Shamil Abdulaev or Shamil Abdulaev (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/hsecoru.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.