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Casual police corruption and the economics of crime Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Bowles, Roger
Garoupa, Nuno
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal International Review of Law and Economics .
Volume (Year): 17 (1997)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Pages: 75-87
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Handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:17:y:1997:i:1:p:75-87Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/irle
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