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Rackets, Regulation, and the Rule of Law

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Author Info
Frye, Timothy
Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina

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Abstract

Governments that levy predatory regulation and provide few weak legal institutions draw businesses into the unofficial economy and compel them to hire private protection organizations. Based on a survey of shopkeepers in three cities in Russia, we find that retail shops face very high levels of predatory regulation and have frequent contacts with private protection rackets. In addition, we show that higher levels of regulation are associated with weaker legal institutions and a higher probability of contact with a private protection organization. We also find that shopkeepers view private protection organizations primarily as a substitute for state-provided police protection and state-provided courts. These results emphasize the importance of public sector reform as a component of economic transition. Copyright 2000 by Oxford University Press.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Journal of Law, Economics and Organization.

Volume (Year): 16 (2000)
Issue (Month): 2 (October)
Pages: 478-502
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Handle: RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:16:y:2000:i:2:p:478-502

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Johnson, Simon & Kaufmann, Daniel & Zoido-Lobaton, Pablo, 1998. "Regulatory Discretion and the Unofficial Economy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(2), pages 387-92, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina V., 2000. "Incentives to provide local public goods: fiscal federalism, Russian style," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 337-368, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Frye, Timothy & Shleifer, Andrei, 1997. "The Invisible Hand and the Grabbing Hand," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(2), pages 354-58, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. T. N. Srinivasan, 1997. "Introduction," Economics and Politics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 9(3), pages 205-205, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. R. H. Parker, Y. Lemarchand, T. Boyns, 1997. "Introduction," Accounting, Business and Financial History, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 7(3), pages 251-257, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Hay, Jonathan R & Shleifer, Andrei, 1998. "Private Enforcement of Public Laws: A Theory of Legal Reform," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(2), pages 398-403, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Alston, Lee J & Ferrie, Joseph P, 1993. "Paternalism in Agricultural Labor Contracts in the U.S. South: Implications for the Growth of the Welfare State," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(4), pages 852-76, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Berkowitz, Daniel & DeJong, David N., 1999. "Russia's internal border," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(5), pages 633-649, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Aghion, P. & Blanchard, O.J., 1993. "On the Speed of Transition in Central Europe," Working papers 93-8, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
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  1. Djankov, Simeon & Qian, Yingyi & Roland, Gérard & Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina, 2006. "Entrepreneurship in China and Russia Compared," CEPR Discussion Papers 5705, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Maxim Bouev, 2002. "Official Regulations and the Shadow Economy: A Labour Market Approach," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 524, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Stephen M. Ross Business School. [Downloadable!]
  3. Richard E. Ericson, 2002. "The Russian economy," Discussion Papers 0102-07, Columbia University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Linda Yueh, 2007. "China's Entrepreneurs," Economics Series Working Papers 324, University of Oxford, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  5. Evgeny Yakovlev & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2007. "Deregulation of Business," Working Papers w0097, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Simeon Djankov & Yingyi Qian & Gerard Roland & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2005. "Who Are China’s Entrepreneurs?," Working Papers w0047, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Bandiera, Oriana, 2002. "Private States and the Enforcement of Property Rights - Theory and Evidence on the Origins of the Sicilian Mafia," CEPR Discussion Papers 3123, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Djankov, Simeon & Miguel, Edward & Qian, Yingyi & Roland, Gérard & Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina, 2006. "Entrepreneurship: First Results from Russia," CEPR Discussion Papers 5707, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  9. Pertti Haaparanta & Tuuli Juurikkala & Olga Lazareva & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya & Jukka Pirttilä & Laura Solanko, 2004. "Firms and public service provision in Russia," Macroeconomics 0401015, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. Matthieu Chemin, 2007. "The Impact of the Judiciary on Entrepreneurship: Evaluation of Pakistan's Access to Justice Programme," Cahiers de recherche 0727, CIRPEE. [Downloadable!]
  11. Simeon Djankov & Edward Miguel & Yingyi Qian & Gerard Roland & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2005. "Who are Russia’s entrepreneurs?," Working Papers w0048, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  12. Simeon Djankov & Yingyi Qian & Gerard Roland & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2006. "Entrepreneurship in Brazil, China, and Russia," Working Papers w0066, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR). [Downloadable!]
  13. Scott Gehlbach, 2003. "Taxability, Elections, and Government Support of Business Activity," Working Papers w0030, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR). [Downloadable!]
  14. Scott Gehlbach, 2003. "Taxability and Low-Productivity Traps," Working Papers w0029, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR). [Downloadable!]
  15. Simeon Djankov & Yingyi Qian & Gerard Roland & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2007. "What Makes a Successful Entrepreneur? Evidence from Brazil," Working Papers w0104, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR). [Downloadable!]
  16. Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky & Konstantin Sonin & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2003. "Capture of Bankruptcy: Theory and Russian Evidence," Working Papers w0038, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR). [Downloadable!]
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