Female representation but male rule? Party competition and the political glass ceiling
AbstractThe share of women in legislative assemblies has grown substantially, but there is still under-representation and it is more severe for more influential appointments. This pattern is mirrored in Swedish municipalities, for which we analyze panel data on the career developments of all 35.000 elected politicians over six election cycles to examine why women fail to rise in the political hierarchy. We show that women have a higher turnover rate which keeps them from accumulating the seniority required to (ever) catch up with their male colleagues. In our analysis, we can rule out that less political experience, lower age, or different responses to changes in family structure are the major contributors to women’s disadvantage. Instead, we find that competition between political parties substantially improves women’s relative performance. We interpret this as evidence for a negative bias against women in the recruitment process being a major contributor to women’s high turnover rate.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Uppsala University, Department of Economics in its series Working Paper Series, Center for Labor Studies with number 2012:9.
Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: 24 Apr 2012
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Department of Economics, Uppsala University, P. O. Box 513, SE-751 20 Uppsala, Sweden
Phone: + 46 18 471 25 00
Fax: + 46 18 471 14 78
Web page: http://www.nek.uu.se/
More information through EDIRC
Careers in politics; Political competition; Supply of politicians;
Other versions of this item:
- Folke, Olle & Rickne, Johanna, 2012. "Female Representation but Male Rule? Party Competition and the Political Glass Ceiling," Working Paper Series 923, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- J45 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Public Sector Labor Markets
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-05-02 (All new papers)
- NEP-DEM-2012-05-02 (Demographic Economics)
- NEP-POL-2012-05-02 (Positive Political Economics)
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