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Under-reporting of Income and Labor Market Performance

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Author Info
Kolm, Ann-Sofie () (Dept. of Economics, Stockholm University)
Nielsen, Søren Bo () (Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School)

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Abstract

To examine the effects on labor market performance of government tax and enforcement policies, this paper develops an equilibrium model featuring tax evasion, matching frictions, and worker-firm wage bargains. In the wage bargains, workers and firms can agree on the amount of remuneration that should not be reported to the tax authorities. We find that increased taxation actually reduces unemployment, whereas more zealous enforcement has the opposite effect.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Stockholm University, Department of Economics in its series Research Papers in Economics with number 2005:5.

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Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: 15 Jun 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhs:sunrpe:2005_0005

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Postal: Department of Economics, Stockholm, S-106 91 Stockholm, Sweden
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Web page: http://www.ne.su.se/
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Related research
Keywords: Unemployment; matching; wage bargaining; tax evasion;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion
J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Francesco Daveri & Guido Tabellini, 2000. "Unemployment, growth and taxation in industrial countries," Economic Policy, CEPR, CES, MSH, vol. 15(30), pages 47-104, 04. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Cremer, Helmuth & Gahvari, Firouz, 1994. " Tax Evasion, Concealment and the Optimal Linear Income Tax," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 96(2), pages 219-39.
  3. Pissarides, Christopher A., 1998. "The impact of employment tax cuts on unemployment and wages; The role of unemployment benefits and tax structure," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 155-183, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Kolm, Ann-Sofie & Larsen, Birthe, 2004. "Does tax evasion affect unemployment and educational choice?," Working Paper Series 2004:4, IFAU - Institute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Yitzhaki, Shlomo, 1974. "Income tax evasion: A theoretical analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 201-202, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Tito Boeri & Pietro Garibaldi, . "Shadow Activity and Unemployment in a Depressed Labor Market," Working Papers 177, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Cremer, Helmuth & Gahvari, Firouz, 1993. "Tax evasion and optimal commodity taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 261-275, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Friedrich Schneider & Dominik H. Enste, 2000. "Shadow Economies: Size, Causes, and Consequences," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 38(1), pages 77-114, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Fugazza, Marco & Jacques, Jean-Francois, 2004. "Labor market institutions, taxation and the underground economy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(1-2), pages 395-418, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Kolm, Ann-Sofie & Larsen, Birthe, 2001. "Wages, Unemployment, and the Underground Economy," Working Paper Series 2001:8, Uppsala University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Mirco Tonin, 2007. "Minimum Wage and Tax Evasion: Theory and Evidence," IEHAS Discussion Papers 0701, Institute of Economics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences. [Downloadable!]
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