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Optimal taxation and monitoring in an economy with matching frictions and underground activities

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  • Gaetano LISI

    ()
    (Cassino University, Italy)

Abstract

This short paper shows the interdependence of taxation and monitoring policy in a search and matching model of equilibrium unemployment with an underground sector. More precisely, from a social welfare standpoint, two options are available to the policy maker: she/he may either substitute a tighter monitoring with a higher penalty or enforce both a higher taxation and an increased monitoring.

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File URL: http://www.ejes.uaic.ro/articles/EJES2011_0201_LIS.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Centre for European Studies, Alexandru Ioan Cuza University in its journal Eastern Journal of European Studies.

Volume (Year): 2(1) (2011)
Issue (Month): (June)
Pages: 5-11

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Handle: RePEc:jes:journl:y:2011:v:2:p:5-11

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Related research

Keywords: optimal taxation; tax evasion; underground economy; job search theory;

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  1. Barbara Petrongolo & Christopher A. Pissarides, 2000. "Looking Into the Black Box: A Survey of the Matching Function," CEP Discussion Papers dp0470, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
  2. Kolm, Ann-Sofie & Nielsen, Søren Bo, 2007. "Under-reporting of income and Labour Market Performance," Working Papers 10-2007, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics.
  3. Kolm, Anne-Sofie & Larsen, Birthe, 2003. "Wages, unemployment, and the underground economy," Working Papers 11-2003, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics.
  4. Jacques, Jean-François & Fugazza, Marco, 2004. "Labor market institutions, taxation and the underground economy," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/1888, Paris Dauphine University.
  5. Lisi, Gaetano, 2011. "Matching Models of Equilibrium Unemployment: An Overview," MPRA Paper 30191, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  6. Hagedorn, Marcus & Manovskii, Iourii, 2008. "The cyclical behavior of equilibrium unemployment and vacancies revisited," Working Paper Series 0853, European Central Bank.
  7. Boeri, Tito & Garibaldi, Pietro, 2002. "Shadow Activity and Unemployment in a Depressed Labour Market," CEPR Discussion Papers 3433, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  8. Albrecht, James & Navarro, Lucas & Vroman, Susan, 2006. "The Effects of Labor Market Policies in an Economy with an Informal Sector," IZA Discussion Papers 2141, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  9. Gaetano Lisi, 2010. "The Strange Case of Dr. “Unemployed” and Mr “Hidden” in Italy," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 30(4), pages 2802-2816.
  10. Klarita G�rxhani, 2004. "The Informal Sector in Developed and Less Developed Countries: A Literature Survey," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 120(3_4), pages 267-300, 09.
  11. Boeri, Tito & Garibaldi, Pietro, 2006. "Shadow Sorting," CEPR Discussion Papers 5487, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Tito Boeri & Pietro Garibaldi, 2005. "Shadow Sorting," NBER Chapters, in: NBER International Seminar on Macroeconomics 2005, pages 125-163 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  12. Simon Burgess & Helene Turon, 2005. "The Cyclical Behavior of Equilibrium Unemployment and Vacancies – A Comment," Bristol Economics Discussion Papers 05/573, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
  13. Maxim Bouev, 2005. "State Regulations, Job Search and Wage Bargaining: A Study in the Economics of the Informal Sector," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series wp764, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
  14. Robert Shimer, 2005. "The Cyclical Behavior of Equilibrium Unemployment and Vacancies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(1), pages 25-49, March.
  15. Maxim Bouev, 2002. "Official Regulations and the Shadow Economy: A Labour Market Approach," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 524, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
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