Trademark Dilution - A Welfare Analysis
AbstractTrademark dilution, whereby a firm associates its product with that of another firm and takes advantage of the goodwill created by that firm, is illegal in the EU and in the US. We investigate this regulation from a welfare perspective, considering short-term effects on profits and consumers’ surplus, as well as long-run effects on investment. We find the circumstances under which laws against trademark dilution are welfare-enhancing to be limited. Under Bertrand competition, trademark dilution is never an equilibrium outcome since a decrease in the amount of product differentiation is always associated with a decrease in the prices and profits of both firms. Under Cournot competition anti-dilution laws may change equilibrium investment patterns, but only for intermediate levels of investment costs. If legislation does have an impact, the welfare effects are ambiguous.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Stockholm University, Department of Economics in its series Research Papers in Economics with number 2004:15.
Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: 10 Oct 2004
Date of revision:
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Postal: Department of Economics, Stockholm, S-106 91 Stockholm, Sweden
Phone: +46 8 16 20 00
Fax: +46 8 16 14 25
Web page: http://www.ne.su.se/
More information through EDIRC
trademark dilution; marketing;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- K11 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Property Law
- K13 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Tort Law and Product Liability; Forensic Economics
- L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2004-11-22 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2004-11-22 (Business Economics)
- NEP-LAW-2004-11-22 (Law & Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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NBER Working Papers
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