Wage bargaining and quality competition
AbstractIn a standard model of vertical differentiation, wage is assumed to determine the quality. Wage is also subject to bargaining. Increased bargaining power of the worker in the low quality firm reduces quality differential, and increases price competitiveness. The Opposite happens from a similar change in the high quality firm.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 30968.
Date of creation: 20 May 2011
Date of revision:
Wage bargaining; Quality competition;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-05-30 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2011-05-30 (Business Economics)
- NEP-COM-2011-05-30 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-GTH-2011-05-30 (Game Theory)
- NEP-LAB-2011-05-30 (Labour Economics)
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