Desai, Sameeksha (University of Missouri and Max Planck Institute of Economics) Eklund, Johan E. () (Jönköping International Business School and The Royal Institute of Technology)
Additional information is available for the following
registered author(s):
In an efficient economy, capital should be quickly (re)allocated from declining firms and sectors to more profitable investment opportunities. This process is affected by the concentration of corporate control, which in turn is affected by market institutions. We employ a panel of 12,000 firms across 44 countries to estimate the functional efficiency of capital markets. We adapt a measure for the efficiency of capital allocation using the accelerator principle. Our empirical results show weak property rights and highly concentrated ownership reduce the functional efficiency of capital markets. Findings support the economic entrenchment hypothesis but not the legal origins hypothesis.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Publisher Info
Paper provided by The Ratio Institute in its series Ratio Working Papers with number
120.
Length: 36 pages Date of creation: 12 May 2008 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:hhs:ratioi:0120
Contact details of provider: Postal: The Ratio Institute, P.O. Box 5095, SE-102 42 Stockholm, Sweden Phone: 08-587 054 00 Fax: 08-587 054 05 Email: Web page: http://www.ratio.se/ More information through EDIRC
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Niclas Berggren).
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Krishna B. Kumar & Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, 1999.
"What Determines Firm Size?,"
NBER Working Papers
7208, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Krishna B. Kumar & Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, .
"What Determines Firm Size?,"
CRSP working papers
496, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
[Downloadable!]
Rafael LaPorta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silane & Christian Pop-Eleches & Andrei Shleifer, 2003.
"Judicial Checks and Balances,"
NBER Working Papers
9775, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Cristian Pop-Eleches & Andrei Shleifer, 2004.
"Judicial Checks and Balances,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 112(2), pages 445-470, April.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1997.
" A Survey of Corporate Governance,"
Journal of Finance,
American Finance Association, vol. 52(2), pages 737-83, June.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 1999.
"Corporate Ownership Around the World,"
Journal of Finance,
American Finance Association, vol. 54(2), pages 471-517, 04.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Did you know? You can import bibliographic info in various formats into you bibliographic tool, or just into your word processor. See under "publisher info" on each abstract page.